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9/11 Revisited: Links missed and found. Al Qaeda as the FALSE FLAG, and the 9/11 as Putin’s “very special political intelligence operation”, in conjunction with Germany and Israel.

 9/11 Revisited: Links missed and found.

Al Qaeda as the FALSE FLAG, and the 9/11 as Putin’s “very special political intelligence operation”, in conjunction with Germany and Israel.

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Al Qaeda as the Russian proxy, and 9/11 as the false flag operation

Al Qaeda as the Russian proxy, and 9/11 as the false flag operation

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Al Qaeda as the Russian proxy, and 9/11 as the false flag operation 

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Articles, Blog, and Tweets in 50 posts

 


Articles, Blog, and Tweets

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My opinion: The 9/11 Attacks were the Russian false flag operation. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. And other posts.

 

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2 days ago

My opinion: The 9/11 Attacks were the Russian false flag operation – All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacksx.com1h@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Russian…

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5 days ago

All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – 10.11.26

 Articles, Blog, and TweetsAll Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacksthenewsandtimes.blog…22h9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINEDArticles, Blog, and Twee…

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6 days ago

9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED

 Articles, Blog, and TweetsArticles, Blog, and Tweets47 min ago@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #C…

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8 days ago

Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms.

Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception https:// – The reliance on unverified sources, – Placement of information by adversaries, – An…

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11 days ago

Audio Text: Putin The Mastermind: He communicates in accidents. The 9/11 Attacks: The Special Tripartite Operation Hypothesis – Google AI Review

Mike Nova 2 · Putin The Mastermind :He communicates in accidents. The 911 Attacks The Special Tripartite Operation Hypothesis Audio PostPutin The Mastermind: He communicates in ac…

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13 days ago

Putin, Ariel Sharon, their political relationship, and the 9/11 attacks

Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠Putin, Ariel Sharon, their political relationship, and the 9/11 attacksTuesday November 3rd, 2026 at 7:51 AM1 ShareAI Mode reply for Putin, Ariel…

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14 days ago

The “Tripartite Hypothesis” regarding Vladimir Putin and the 9/11 attacks is an unverified, alternative counterintelligence theory

 Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – The “Tripartite Hypothesis” – Google AI ReviewSunday November 1st, 2026 at 3:21 PM1 ShareThe Master…

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15 days ago

Evidence, legal and otherwise, that the so called “Al Qaeda” is the original primary source behind the 9/11 attacks?

Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠Evidence, legal and otherwise, that the so called “Al Qaeda” is the original primary source behind the 9/11 attacks?Saturday October 31st, 2026 a…

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17 days ago

The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation?

9/11 Revisited:  Was it the Putin – Sharon – Schroeder’s Very Special Political Intelligence Operation?  Audio Post Synopsis 1. Overview 9/11 Revisited: Was it the Putin – Sharon -…

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17 days ago

Putin the Mastermind – Review

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17 days ago

Recent Posts: Reading Putin’s mind: he communicates in accidents – Review

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18 days ago

Reading Putin’s mind: he communicates in accidents – Review

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18 days ago

Latest Starred Posts – Review

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18 days ago

The very strange case of August Hanning – Review

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18 days ago

The role of Israel in the 9/11 Attacks – Review

x.com1d@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad It is entirely possible that The Bulldozer Sharon went to bed (IN CAHOOTS) with The Mastermind Putin in orchestrating the 9/11, wi…

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18 days ago

Sharon remained perpetually suspicious that Washington would pressure him into territorial or security concessions

The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – All Feeds Reviewx.com2h@mikenov: Sharon remained perpetually suspicious that Washington would pressure him into territorial or security…

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18 days ago

All Feeds Review: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

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19 days ago

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27 days ago

Operation 9/11: Putin was the Mastermind at the head of the Anti-American Alliance of the Intelligence Services of Russia, Germany, and Israel – the Hypothesis.

The 9/11 Reexamined: Putin was the Mastermind at the head of the Anti-American Alliance of the Intelligence Services of Russia, Germany, and Israel – the HypothesisThe Operation 9/…

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27 days ago

Articles and Tweets: The Mastermind – Selected Tweets

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28 days ago

The Mastermind: Selected Tweets

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1 mon ago

The Missing Links – Audio Post

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The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

#DOJ DOJ #ODNI ODNI #Trump Trump THE MASTERMIND https://t.co/lhwnof4je6— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) October 19, 2026 – Putin The Mastermind: The Russia – Germany – Israel Hypot…

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1 mon ago

The phrase “9/11: the missing link” refers to a prominent public theory and a series of high-profile statements made by August Hanning

 DER SPIEGEL@derspiegel·3hTranslated from German”Disgrace,” “Bear’s Service to Peace,” “Miracle Cure à la Rasputin”: German politicians condemn Gerhard Schröder’s participation in …

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1 mon ago

August Hanning on the official Hamburg Cell investigations: The missing piece is THE STATE SUPPORT. – Selected Tweets

August Hanning on the official Hamburg Cell investigations: The missing piece is THE STATE SUPPORT.  Selected Tweets What he did not say or did not know was, that this “State Suppo…

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1 mon ago

If Russia isn’t defeated in Ukraine, we will have to fight and defeat it elsewhere. Let’s help Ukraine finish the job …

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1 mon ago

If Russia, Israel, and Germany are behind 9/11, here are their hypothetical motivations.

 Russia, Israel, Germany, and 9/11If Russia, Israel, and Germany are behind 9/11, here are their hypothetical motivations. Russia intended to stop further unravelling of the USSR …

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1 mon ago

Azerbaijan is reportedly behind the corruption of the former German intelligence chief

 Articles and TweetsX8h#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Reinvestigate 9/11 in the light of August Hanning’s arrest and investigation! – Tweets Reviewx1d@mikenov: CORRUPTION IS THE …

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1 mon ago

Reinvestigate 9/11 in the light of August Hanning’s arrest and investigation!

 @mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad My Opinion: It is very unlikely that any documents on the true origins of 9/11 exist in principle – the matter is so sensitive and explo…

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1 mon ago

Analyzing 9/11 PDBs and Deception Hypotheses Quote: “A significant portion of the intelligence regarding Al-Qaeda’s intentions came from foreign liaison services (including British, French, German, Russian, and Israeli intelligence)”. My opinion: If “Germ

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Audio Post – News Review: Using the FBI to settle personal grievances … Weaponization of the FBI … Trump, Patel, Miller, and the FBI … Arrest of Albanian Intelligence Chief

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AUDIO POST – News Review: Putin aims to break Ukraine by terrorizing the civilian population … Russia Turns to Striking Kyiv’s Bridges, Threatening a Vital Lifeline … Merz in Kyiv … Albanian Spy Chief’s Arrest ‘Highlighted Failure of Intelligenc

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Musk returns to Trump administration to co-lead Pentagon war study – News Review

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1 mon ago

Super Intelligence – News Review

Articles and TweetsX19msuper intelligenceX1hRT by @mikenov: RT by @mikenov: Putin orders military leaders to target civilians and nuclear facilities, Zelensky warns: ‘No rules now’…

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Vladimir Putin warns West over Kaliningrad threats – News Review

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Russia threatens to strike Nato with nuclear weapons ‘right from the outset’ – News Review

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1 mon ago

Hackers exploited a Pentagon file-sharing flaw, stealing personnel records of over 3 million people. -News Review

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1 mon ago

Global News and Current Events

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1 mon ago

A man accused of making the threatening calls to Katie Miller

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1 mon ago

Two senior FBI agents ousted over investigation into alleged harassing calls to wife of Trump adviser Stephen Miller

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1 mon ago

Konstantive Borovoy, a liberal Russian politician and dissident, claims that he provided U.S. authorities with an explicit advance warning regarding the September 11 attacks.

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1 mon ago

Report: Trump again urged Ukrainian President Zelensky to travel to Moscow for direct talks

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ShinyHunters FBI Hack and National Security Impact: the shinyhunters 2026 fbi hack and the transnational organized crime

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Massive FBI Data Breach Investigation

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Hackers Say They Stole Thousands of Sensitive F.B.I. Personnel Records

Articles and Tweetsnytimes53mHackers Say They Stole Thousands of Sensitive F.B.I. Personnel RecordsThe compromise, if confirmed, would be the latest in a string of cybersecurity fa…

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Articles and TweetsX41m#Putin #Europe #Russia Putin vs Europe Tensions between Russian President Vladimir Putin and European nations have escalated dramatically, marked by sharp di…

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My opinion: The 9/11 Attacks were the Russian false flag operation – All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks 

All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Russian disinformation also points to their involvement. Nine Lies from Russia About 9/11

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Russian disinformation also points to their involvement. Nine Lies from Russia About 9/11

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadRussian disinformation also points to their involvement.Nine Lies from Russia About 9/11 voanews.com/a/fact-check-rus…
@mikenov: Nine Lies from Russia About 9/11

@mikenov: Nine Lies from Russia About 9/11

Nine Lies from Russia About 9/11 voanews.com/a/fact-check-rus…

@mikenov: The 9/11 Attacks were the Russian false flag operation.

The 9/11 Attacks were the Russian false flag operation. – Google Search google.com/search?num=10&new…
@mikenov: 9/11 — the day that changed the world

@mikenov: 9/11 — the day that changed the world

9/11 — the day that changed the world dw.com/en/9-11-the-day-that-…
Obituary: Mohammed Atef

Obituary: Mohammed Atef

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from The Guardian. Mohammed Atef, who was killed, aged 57, in an United States air raid near Kabul was, according to US intelligence, the military planner of the Islamist al-Qaida group. US Intelligence also identified him as having masterminded the bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The US had placed a $5m reward on his head.The Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir – who recently met Osama bin Laden – said that he had met Atef in 1997. In that meeting, Atef told him of his role in organising “resistance” against the US presence in Somalia in 1992. This included the downing of a US helicopter in which 18 soldiers were killed.According to the Islamist lawyer Montasser Zayat, Atef was born in Menoufya – the birthplace of Egyptian presidents Mubarak and Sadat – in the Nile Delta, 50km north of Cairo, and he did two-years’ army national service. Interior ministry officials dismissed suggestions that Atef was a policeman, but he had no profile – and no police record – before he left Egypt in the mid-1980s to join the jihad – the holy war – against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.He was not, said Zayat, among hundreds of militants arrested by Egyptian police following the assassination of President Sadat by members of the Egyptian Jihad group in 1981. The only conviction he got in Egypt was 18 years later, when he was tried in absentia among 107 defendants accused of membership of the Jihad group, led by al-Qaida’s deputy, Ayman Zawaheri, and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. This signalled that the Egyptian authorities knew little about his role until recently.Atef, according to the lawyer, got to know Zawaheri shortly after his arrival in Afghanistan. He was immediately sent to one of several military training camps financed by Bin Laden to fight the Russians, with the blessing of the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Zayat says it was Zawaheri who introduced Atef to Bin Laden; he became one of the Saudi’s most trusted associates.He also developed a variety of names. Born Sobhi Abu Sitta, he was also Abu Hafs Al-Misri. Al Misri – the Arabic word for Egyptian – referred to his country of origin at a time when thousands of young mojahedeen from all over the Moslem world were flocking to join Bin Laden’s al-Qaida. Other names he used to shield his identity were El-Kabir (the big man), Taysir, Sheik Taysir Abdullah and Abu Khadijah.After al-Qaida’s first military commander, Ali al-Rashidi – more often known as Abu Obeida Al-Bansheeri – died when his boat capsized in Lake Victoria while on a recruiting mission, Atef inherited his post. Atef was also reportedly responsible for Bin Laden’s security. He personally searched journalists who wanted to meet the Saudi dissident after the US bombed Afghanistan in 1998.Atef, according to militants who encountered him while training in Afghanistan, was a very quiet man. In the first tape released by Bin Laden after the US bombing campaign against Afghanistan began on October 7, Zawaheri, Atef and the al-Qaida spokesman, the Kuwaiti, Suleiman Abu Geith sat next to each other. Only Atef made no speech blasting the US.Atef strengthened his relationship with Bin Laden by following in Prophet Mohamed’s tradition. He married his daughter to one of bin Laden’s many sons, and the two sat smiling and sipping tea during their videotaped wedding released by al-Qaida early this year. In the tape, Bin Laden claimed responsibility for the first time for the suicide attack against the destroyer USS Cole, in Yemen, which killed 17 sailors.Atef was a devout man whose hope, like all members of al-Qaida, had been to die as a martyr. The man expected to take Atef’s position is another Egyptian close to Zawaheri, Mohamed Mekawi, known as Seif El-Adl.· Mohammed Atef (Sobhi Abu Sitta) Islamist born 1944; died November 14-15 2001
@mikenov: Mohammed Atef | Afghanistan

@mikenov: Mohammed Atef | Afghanistan

Mohammed Atef | Afghanistan | The Guardian theguardian.com/news/2001/no…
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef and his Russian Connections

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef and his Russian Connections

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadMohammed Atef and his Russian Connections share.gemini.google/hRM2z1lF…
@mikenov: Mohammed Atef and Russian Connections

@mikenov: Mohammed Atef and Russian Connections

Mohammed Atef and Russian Connections share.gemini.google/hRM2z1lF…

@mikenov: Mohammed Atef

Mohammed Atef | Counter Extremism Project counterextremism.com/extremi…
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections  Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 200

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 200

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadMohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections – Google Search google.com/search?q=Mohammed… Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 2001, had no verified operational alliance or formal ties with the Russian government. Rather, his documented connections to Russia and the former Soviet Union were adversarial, involving direct military conflict, proxy support for anti-Russian insurgencies, and illicit attempts to acquire post-Soviet weaponry. [1]Key Points of IntersectionThe Soviet–Afghan War. Atef, a former Egyptian police officer and member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight against the Soviet military occupation. Operating alongside Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, Atef helped recruit, train, and organize Arab mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces, laying the groundwork for the founding of al-Qaeda in 1988. [1, 2]The Chechen Conflicts and the Hamburg Cell. As al-Qaeda’s military chief in the 1990s, Atef oversaw training camps in Afghanistan that hosted militants from across the globe, including fighters heading to or returning from the wars against Russian forces in Chechnya. Notably, the core members of the 9/11 “Hamburg cell”—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh—initially traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999 with the intention of fighting Russian troops in the Second Chechen War. Atef personally vetted them at the camps and redirected them from the Chechen front to carry out the September 11 attacks in the United States. [1, 2, 3, 4]Post-Soviet Weapons Procurement. Intelligence assessments and counterterrorism profiles—including research from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point—note that Atef actively pushed for al-Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and advanced conventional arms. Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda leadership sought to exploit black-market networks emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union to obtain radiological materials, chemical agents, and handheld surface-to-air missiles. [1, 2, 3]Confusion with Other Militants. Discussions of “Russian connections” occasionally stem from mistaken identity involving Atef’s nom de guerre, Abu Hafs al-Masri. Following Atef’s death in 2001, other militants used similar aliases—most notably Abu Hafs al-Urdani, a Jordanian commander who led foreign mujahideen fighters against Russian forces in Chechnya in the mid-2000s, and the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a shadowy group that issued propaganda claims for various international attacks. [1, 2, 3, 4]Context on Intelligence ClaimsFollowing Atef’s death, counterterrorism investigations revealed that several detainees—such as Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi—fabricated stories about Atef’s foreign state connections (most famously claiming he sent emissaries to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq for chemical weapons training) to mislead interrogators. Similarly, unverified conspiracy theories alleging KGB or FSB ties to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership have been widely dismissed by mainstream intelligence analysts and historians. [1]
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections  Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 200

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 200

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadMohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections – Google Search google.com/search?q=Mohammed… Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 2001, had no verified operational alliance or formal ties with the Russian government. Rather, his documented connections to Russia and the former Soviet Union were adversarial, involving direct military conflict, proxy support for anti-Russian insurgencies, and illicit attempts to acquire post-Soviet weaponry. [1]Key Points of IntersectionThe Soviet–Afghan War. Atef, a former Egyptian police officer and member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight against the Soviet military occupation. Operating alongside Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, Atef helped recruit, train, and organize Arab mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces, laying the groundwork for the founding of al-Qaeda in 1988. [1, 2]The Chechen Conflicts and the Hamburg Cell. As al-Qaeda’s military chief in the 1990s, Atef oversaw training camps in Afghanistan that hosted militants from across the globe, including fighters heading to or returning from the wars against Russian forces in Chechnya. Notably, the core members of the 9/11 “Hamburg cell”—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh—initially traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999 with the intention of fighting Russian troops in the Second Chechen War. Atef personally vetted them at the camps and redirected them from the Chechen front to carry out the September 11 attacks in the United States. [1, 2, 3, 4]Post-Soviet Weapons Procurement. Intelligence assessments and counterterrorism profiles—including research from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point—note that Atef actively pushed for al-Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and advanced conventional arms. Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda leadership sought to exploit black-market networks emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union to obtain radiological materials, chemical agents, and handheld surface-to-air missiles. [1, 2, 3]Confusion with Other Militants. Discussions of “Russian connections” occasionally stem from mistaken identity involving Atef’s nom de guerre, Abu Hafs al-Masri. Following Atef’s death in 2001, other militants used similar aliases—most notably Abu Hafs al-Urdani, a Jordanian commander who led foreign mujahideen fighters against Russian forces in Chechnya in the mid-2000s, and the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a shadowy group that issued propaganda claims for various international attacks. [1, 2, 3, 4]Context on Intelligence ClaimsFollowing Atef’s death, counterterrorism investigations revealed that several detainees—such as Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi—fabricated stories about Atef’s foreign state connections (most famously claiming he sent emissaries to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq for chemical weapons training) to mislead interrogators. Similarly, unverified conspiracy theories alleging KGB or FSB ties to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership have been widely dismissed by mainstream intelligence analysts and historians. [1]
@Osint613: RT by @mikenov: BREAKING: Darchiev, Russia's ambassador to the U.S., has died.

@Osint613: RT by @mikenov: BREAKING: Darchiev, Russia’s ambassador to the U.S., has died.

BREAKING: Darchiev, Russia’s ambassador to the U.S., has died.- Russian Foreign Ministry

@mikenov: Bin Laden denied role in 9/11 at first

Bin Laden denied role in 9/11 at first – Google Search google.com/search?q=Bin+Lade…
@mikenov: Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda military chief

@mikenov: Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda military chief

Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda military chief – Google Search google.com/search?q=Mohammed…
All Feeds Review - The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

Articles, Blog, and TweetsAll Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacksthenewsandtimes.blog…22h9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINEDArticles, Blog, and TweetsArticles, Blog, and Tweets47 min ago@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google SearchArticles, Blog, and Tweets56 min ago@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google SearchArticles, Blog, and Tweets1 hrs ago@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticatedThe News And Times Information Network – Blogs By Michael Novakhov – thenewsandtimes.blogspot.comx.com23h@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacksx.com23h@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacksx.com1d@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticatedx.com1d@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconvtandfonline.com1dThe 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and CounterintelligenceMichael_Novakhov shared this story. Abstract The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were undoubtedly the most brazen and shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history. Al Qaeda’s capacity to achieve this outcome depended in large part on its meticulous intelligence and counterintelligence preparations. These activities allowed Al Qaeda to exert a strong measure of control over its operating environment, leading to a confidence that events would unfold as planned. Moreover, intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to form highly accurate and realistic assessments of its environment, an outcome that helps to dispel notions of an organization consumed by a level of fanaticism that distorts its perception of reality, or else frustrates its capacity to engage in rational decision making. This article examines Al Qaeda’s use of intelligence and counterintelligence using the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001 (hereinafter, “the 9/11 attacks”) as a case study. It will trace Al Qaeda’s collection and use of operational intelligence, with particular emphasis on how this intelligence may have influenced a range of operational decisions and how it may provide evidence of Al Qaeda’s rational approach to decision making. The use of intelligence influenced critical elements of the operation, so that various key decisions were directly determined by operational intelligence accumulated over a lengthy period. This article will analyze how those involved in the operation, including both the operatives and the leadership that directed and coordinated it, craved high levels of certainty and operational control. It will examine the idea that this search for certainty was largely satiated by the organization’s extensive use of intelligence. Aligning decisions to accommodate the conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation served to maximize Al Qaeda’s chance of achieving operational success. Similarly, counterintelligence allowed for the creation of a security umbrella that shielded the operation from exposure throughout all its stages. The nature of the operation dictated the need for the hijackers to engage in behavior that exposed them to constant risk. From communications between the various levels involved in the planning and execution of the operation, to the extensive travel and preparation undertaken by the hijackers, each activity was fraught with danger. This article will critically investigate the proposition that counterintelligence allowed the hijackers to function with confidence during each of these activities, secure in the knowledge that the operation had not been compromised and that they maintained the crucial element of surprise. This case study will, therefore, seek to examine the extent to which intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to engage in decision making based on accurate representations of reality rather than false illusions influenced by strong ideological or dogmatic perceptions of the world. Moreover, it will examine the argument that Al Qaeda’s intelligence and counterintelligence preparations for the operation may be suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the means–ends logic that exemplify most explanations of terrorist rationality.Footnote 1 For example, attempts to manipulate the terrorists’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and very specific intelligence suggests a desire to base decisions on near-complete information, not just that which was immediately presented to the group. Intelligence collection on this level was intended to allow Al Qaeda to carry out operations without encountering the type of unanticipated outcomes that could lead to operational failure or blunt the impact of its political or ideological message. Just because events would demonstrate that Al Qaeda was unable to achieve an outcome as resounding as this does not diminish the rationality of its decision making or the role intelligence was expected to discharge in this process. In this way, this study will fill a significant gap in the understanding of the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although some effort has previously been made to examine the counterintelligence protocols of Al Qaeda during the operation,Footnote 2 no attempt has been made to assess the role of intelligence in these events. In neither case, however, has there been a serious attempt to contextualize the function of intelligence and counterintelligence as key activities within Al Qaeda’s decision-making process. Although descriptions of intelligence and counterintelligence in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks routinely stress their operational importance, analyses linking these activities to decision making and the organization’s capacity to engage in rational behavior appear non-existent. Operational Intelligence An analysis of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation demonstrates that the strength of its contribution resided in two areas, namely that of assisting in the preparation of a detailed plan, and to a lesser extent, target identification. It will be demonstrated that Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation were designed to uncover as much detail as possible about their targets and operating environment to optimize the likelihood of operational success. An examination of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation will be served best by examining two distinct phases to the operation, those of conceptualization and planning.Footnote 3 These phases clearly delineate the impact of intelligence on Al Qaeda decision making at critical junctures of the operation’s evolution, while also demonstrating the considered, deliberate, and methodical approach that characterized a decision-making process that spanned years. Revealing a clear capacity to calculate costs and benefits, frequently with the assistance of detailed intelligence, Al Qaeda during these phases displayed the hallmarks of a rational organization that engaged in reflective rather than impulsive decision making designed to achieve an act of violence of tremendous strategic and symbolic importance.Footnote 4 Conceptualization To understand the role of intelligence in facilitating the 9/11 operation, it is first necessary to analyze its genesis as an idea. Such an examination will demonstrate that intelligence fulfilled a limited role during the earliest phases of the operation when discussion focused on the method of attack and preferred targets. It will be contended, however, that the operation’s conception at the apex of the Al Qaeda hierarchy, along with the formulation of a tentative strategy, precluded a need for the type of detailed intelligence that normally determines these fundamental questions. It will be demonstrated that by the time the Al Qaeda leadership approved the operation, the method of attack, along with at least some of the targets, had, for years, formed part of the thinking of those central to the operation. As the following discussion will show, the historical development of the 9/11 operation facilitated a refining process that transformed it from an ambitious idea into reality. The driving force behind the 9/11 operation was Kuwaiti-born Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereafter “Khalid”). By the time Khalid presented his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership for what would ultimately become the 9/11 operation (known within Al Qaeda as the “planes operation”), and prior to his membership of the organization, he had already demonstrated a keen interest in the use of aircraft for terrorist attacks. In the most well-known and ambitious of these plans, the “Bojinka” plot, Khalid and others planned to bomb twelve U.S. commercial aircraft over the Pacific during a two-day period.Footnote 5 Working with his nephew and principal plotter behind the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef, Khalid played an active role in this, his first terrorist operation.Footnote 6 This multifaceted plot also involved a plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his planned visit to the Philippines in January 1995. It seems to have been Yousef’s idea to use co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad, a trained pilot, to fly a light aircraft over the route to be taken by the Pope and drop bombs over the side.Footnote 7 At this time, Murad also contemplated flying a light aircraft loaded with chemical weapons into CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.Footnote 8 This idea emerged in casual conversation between Murad and Yousef, and no specific plan for its execution was devised.Footnote 9 At about this time, Khalid and Yousef also developed a plan to bomb U.S.-bound cargo flights by placing jackets containing nitrocellulose on board.Footnote 10 Thus, Khalid demonstrated a consistent pattern of behavior and interest, at the center of which lay the use of aircraft to attack U.S. interests. Significantly, Jack Roche informed this author that when he met Khalid for the first time in early 2000, the latter asked Roche whether the United States and Israel operated commercial aircraft out of Australia. Although this was not taken any further, Roche believes that Khalid was scouting for targets within Australia.Footnote 11 The idea of using hijacked aircraft as weapons also extended to senior members of Al Qaeda, even before Khalid put forward his proposal for the planes operation. It is believed that Mohammed Atef, at that time Al Qaeda’s operational commander, conducted a study in 1996 that concluded that traditional hijackings failed to meet the organization’s goal of inflicting mass casualties.Footnote 12 The study reportedly considered the feasibility of hijacking aircraft and blowing them up in flight. Thus, the idea of using aircraft had some precedence within Al Qaeda, and among others on the periphery of the organization, that would ultimately perform a central role in the 9/11 operation. Furthermore, it was apparent that the use of aircraft, especially in an unconventional sense, was seen as a vulnerability to existing security arrangements. Indeed, Khalid considered the use of aircraft a more effective and less problematic form of attack compared to conventional bombing methods, a lesson he claims to have learnt from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. With this in mind, he and Yousef considered using aircraft as weapons in attacks on targets that included the World Trade Center, and, as discussed earlier, CIA headquarters.Footnote 13 Unable to realize his ambitions of carrying out an operation involving the use of aircraft on his own, Khalid was given an opportunity in mid-1996 to present his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership.Footnote 14 During the course of this meeting, Khalid proposed an operation involving trained pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States.Footnote 15 Although bin Laden remained non-committal, he agreed, two years later, to support Khalid’s proposal. Over a series of meetings involving bin Laden, Khalid, and Mohammed Atef in early 1999, it was decided that the initial list of targets would include the White House, the U.S. Capitol Building, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.Footnote 16 It is not known how detailed and involved these discussions were, and whether this list included other targets that were subsequently rejected for unknown reasons. Furthermore, it is not clear if intelligence was consulted in any comprehensive way during this initial period. It is plausible, however, that the suggested method of the attack precluded the need for intelligence at this stage because the use of aircraft as “flying bombs” exposed virtually every potential U.S. target to attack. In other words, the difficulties associated with conventional bombing methods in terms of ground security could be overcome through the use of aircraft. The Al Qaeda leadership was thus free to choose the targets it wanted, being guided almost entirely by the “statement” it wished to make through the attacks. Indeed, this appears to have been the sole consideration at this time, with the World Trade Center seen as symbolic of U.S. economic power, the Pentagon, a symbol of its military power, the U.S. Capitol as emblematic of U.S. policy on Israel, and the White House, a symbol of general U.S. political power.Footnote 17 In time, however, intelligence would reveal problems specific to this method of attack. It would appear that these problems were identified only after the hijackers engaged in reconnaissance flights. In this regard, intelligence fulfilled its intended function by identifying circumstances that could be expected to impact on the likelihood of operational success. By replicating conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ intelligence collection efforts were successful in identifying impediments not anticipated by the Al Qaeda leadership at the time of target selection. The indecision over whether to strike at the White House or the Capitol Building emerged only after the hijackers’ intelligence activities made it apparent that attacking the White House would be more problematic than initially anticipated. Indeed, it seems likely that Mohammed Atta was given some latitude over target selection, because the number of targets that formed the initial list (the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, the Capitol, and the White House) exceeded the number of aircraft to be hijacked.Footnote 18 It may, therefore, be presumed that Atta was to prioritize these targets.Footnote 19 Although it is not clear on what basis they were to be prioritized, there are strong indications that intelligence played some role in this process. From the outset of the “planes operation,” bin Laden was determined to attack the White House, emphasizing his preference on a number of occasions.Footnote 20 In May 2001, for example, bin Laden met with operations coordinator Ramzi Binalshibh, instructing him to confirm that Atta understood that bin Laden’s preference was for the White House over the Capitol. Atta, however, clearly had problems with bin Laden’s continued preference for the White House. Atta informed Binalshibh on at least two separate occasions that he considered the White House too difficult a target.Footnote 21 It is not clear why Atta considered the White House a difficult target, although Khalid’s 2002 comment to journalist Yosri Fouda that reconnaissance teams dismissed it for “navigation reasons,” may be close to the truth. According to Khalid, the small size of the White House made it difficult to see from the air, while the strong defenses surrounding the building made it a less attractive target than the Capitol.Footnote 22 Despite these difficulties, Atta informed Binalshibh that he had tasked Hazmi and Hanjour to conduct reconnaissance on the White House to evaluate the feasibility of an attack, and was apparently awaiting their answer at the time of Atta’s meeting with Binalshibh. Atta also indicated at this time that these two operatives had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of the Pentagon.Footnote 23 It therefore seems clear from events that a process was in place to conduct intelligence activities designed to refine the target list with a view to maximizing the likelihood of operational success. Although it is true that the role of intelligence in this process was minor compared to operations such as that of the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya in 1998, it is nevertheless indicative of a deliberate and considered approach to decision making in which the weighing of the possibilities and likely outcomes was determined by intelligence. It is also plausible that other intelligence was consulted in deciding on the preferred targets. Dhiren Barot and his associates were actively engaged in reconnaissance in the United States some time after the Al Qaeda leadership approved the “planes operation.” It is known that Barot entered the United States in August 2000 and again in March 2001, and that during these visits travelled to New York and Washington, D.C.Footnote 24 Barot may have scouted potential targets for the “planes operation,” in addition to those that became the subject of his casing reports. Indeed, Khalid confirmed that during the planning for the “planes operation,” he had direct contact with Barot, sending him on at least two missions during this period.Footnote 25 Other reporting also indicates possible surveillance activity in New York before 9/11 that was considered of sufficient concern that it was included in a Presidential Daily Brief in August 2001 addressing bin Laden’s intention to attack the United States.Footnote 26 Planning By the time Khalid approached bin Laden with his idea that would become the 9/11 operation, the hijacking of aircraft was a method looking for an operation. The method of attack thus formed the essence of the operation, providing a unique mode of attack capable of circumventing existing defensive measures while also facilitating Al Qaeda’s aim of inflicting mass casualties. Intelligence during the planning phase, therefore, sought to identify vulnerabilities that would facilitate the preferred method of attack. Although the planned use of hijacked aircraft also influenced target selection by identifying vulnerabilities consistent with the method of attack (e.g., the need for buildings to be clearly visible from the air), it was during the planning phase of the operation that intelligence made its most significant contribution. Intelligence would be used to determine those details of the plan capable of facilitating the preferred method of attack in such a way as to maximize the likelihood of success. Moreover, the hijackers’ intelligence preparations were intended to achieve a high level of calculability of results by identifying security arrangements they could expect to encounter on the day of the operation. This knowledge could then be used to facilitate planning capable of negating or circumventing these security arrangements. Binalshibh would subsequently convey the thoroughness of these intelligence activities when he commented that the hijackers studied, “the security arrangements that [were] adopted at all the airports and establish[ed] a comprehensive picture about the procedures at all the airports and also unravel[ed] the security loopholes that exist at these airports … [and found] out the trips that depart and arrive at these airports … [as well as] the level of security at these airports.”Footnote 27 Within months of receiving permission to proceed with the attack, Khalid took the first steps in assembling the body of intelligence that would make the attacks possible. Relying on open source intelligence, Khalid compiled data from Western aviation magazines, telephone directories for U.S. cities, airline timetables, and conducted Internet searches on U.S. flight schools. This intelligence was supplemented by flight simulator software and information gleaned from movies depicting hijackings.Footnote 28 Some of these early intelligence efforts may have been an attempt to generate ideas and identify possible vulnerabilities. Familiarity with the enemy’s methods and culture was also deemed important at this early stage, as was the need to provide the suicide operatives the basic skills and knowledge to function in an unfamiliar and hostile environment. Khalid, therefore, organized a short course for the operatives in Karachi, which included techniques on how to conduct reconnaissance on flights. Although rudimentary in nature, these instructions proved critical in bringing the attack to fruition by encouraging the operatives to probe for vulnerabilities in the routine behavior of the flight crew. These instructions included the need to observe cabin doors during take-off and landing, whether the captain exited the cockpit during the flight, and at what stage, and using what methods, flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.Footnote 29 It was not long after that actual casing flights took place with the purpose of probing for weaknesses in airport security arrangements, and ascertaining the feasibility of elements of the plan as they stood at that point in time. One of the suicide operatives in particular, Khallad, engaged in intelligence activity with these ends in mind. For example, he flew from Bangkok to Hong Kong in early January 2000 on board a U.S. airliner, seating himself in first class. This casing flight would prove instructive because it identified problems perhaps not anticipated by the operation’s planners. For instance, Khallad was unable to view the cockpit from his seat. He also probed airport security by carrying a box cutter onto the aircraft in his toiletries bag. He subsequently removed this bag from his carry-on luggage, observing that flight staff paid no attention.Footnote 30 The hijackers conducted further intelligence activity after their arrival in the United States, again with the intention of identifying vulnerabilities capable of advancing the plan. This reconnaissance was typified by a hands-on approach designed to identify conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. In this way, the plan would enjoy a greater likelihood of success because decisions would not be based on false assumptions that could mean the difference between success and failure. Realism, not distorted notions of reality determined by powerful ideological views, served to shape operational planning. For example, it is suspected that the hijackers conducted numerous surveillance flights in an attempt to proximate as near as possible the circumstances likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. Seeking to replicate these conditions, the pilots conducted their surveillance flights while seated in first class, enabling them to monitor the cockpit and also observe firsthand the activities in first class on a transcontinental flight similar to the one that they would take on 11 September. Each also conducted their surveillance flight on the same type of aircraft he would pilot on the day of the hijackings, thereby injecting further realism into the surveillance process.Footnote 31 On the basis of the surveillance flights, Atta informed Binalshibh in July 2001 that the best time to storm the cockpit was 10 to 15 minutes after take-off when the cockpit was normally opened for the first time.Footnote 32 It is also plausible that the hijackers compared the results of their surveillance activity for the purpose of identifying behavior common to their flights, thus permitting the identification of routines susceptible to exploitation. In keeping with the hijackers’ desire to engage in activity closely replicating the conditions expected during the day of the operation, some pilots also took practice flights near some of their targets. For instance, Hani Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi (American Airlines Flight 77, which was flown into the Pentagon) rented a plane and traveled a route close to Washington, D.C.Footnote 33 It is significant that Jarrah and Hanjour also took separate training flights along the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude route along the Hudson River that passed by landmarks such as the World Trade Center. In fact, the Hudson Corridor would have provided the pilots an excellent view of the World Trade Center towers, and at the time was open to uncontrolled aircraft flying below 1,200 feet.Footnote 34 Atta also informed Binalshibh that he, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah carried box cutters onto their surveillance flights, encountering no problems. These surveillance flights were so successful that Atta informed Binalshibh that he would not need other weapons, and that he was so confident the cockpit doors would be opened that he did not consider contingency plans.Footnote 35 This represents an important example of the ability of intelligence to elevate terrorist confidence levels by helping to establish operational certainty. In an attempt to explore alternate means of gaining access to the cockpit, the hijackers’ intelligence probes went beyond that of passive observation. For instance, it was reported that on 1 August 2001, Abdulaziz Alomari boarded a flight from Las Vegas to New York. Before taking off, Alomari made an attempt to secure a ride in the cockpit’s jump seat all the way to New York, on the pretext that he was on the verge of flying for Egypt Air. After being shown to the cockpit, it became apparent to the crew that Alomari was not what he claimed to be and was asked to leave the cockpit prior to take-off. During the course of the flight, he told a flight attendant that he left his pen in the cockpit and, therefore, needed to return to the flight deck. He was told that he would not be able to return to the cockpit, especially while the aircraft was in flight.Footnote 36 These highly developed intelligence collection methods were suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the simple means–ends logic that characterizes most explanations of terrorist rationality. Attempts to manipulate the hijackers’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and accurate intelligence suggest a desire to attain near-perfect intelligence in which chance would play a negligible role. To those within the law enforcement and intelligence community with even a rudimentary knowledge of Al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad, the attacks on 9/11 could hardly have been a strategic surprise.Footnote 37 Al Qaeda’s enmity toward the United States and its desire to carry out an attack on U.S. soil was well known prior to 9/11.Footnote 38 Al Qaeda had already declared, in 1998, that it was in a state of war with the United States. Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa in which he urges jihad against Americans is unambiguous, declaring that the killing of, “… the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it…”Footnote 39 This was, in turn, followed by attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa (August 1998)Footnote 40 and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (October 2000). Furthermore, the arrest of Ahmed Ressam on the U.S.–Canadian border in December 1999 was a clear indication of Al Qaeda’s intention of bringing its war to the United States. This pattern of behavior was preceded by the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the planned attacks on prominent New York landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel, which, although not Al Qaeda inspired or organized, were certainly indicative of the dawning of a brand of Islamic militancy intent on striking directly at the United States. This strategic warning was supplemented by tactical intelligence revealing the possibility of a terrorist strike in the period leading up to 9/11.Footnote 41 Indeed, the perceived threat from Al Qaeda was such that the collection of intelligence on Al Qaeda became a high priority for U.S. intelligence and the White House in the two years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although arguments persist about whether the U.S. intelligence community pursued Al Qaeda with sufficient vigor in this period, it is clear that Al Qaeda was an important target whose capabilities and intentions were well known.Footnote 42 The Director of Central Intelligence at the time of the attacks, George Tenet, acknowledged this state of war, observing, “ … even before September 2001, we knew we faced a foe that is committed, resilient and has operational depth. The Intelligence Community was already at war with al-Qaida.”Footnote 43 Despite these indicators, the 9/11 hijackers were able to avoid detection, even though the first hijackers arrived in the United States 20 months before the attacks. The effectiveness of their counterintelligence tradecraft was such that Tenet informed the Joint Inquiry investigating the 9/11 attacks that, “[b]ased on what we know today, the investigation of the 9/11 attacks has revealed no major slip in the conspirators’ operational security.”Footnote 44 This statement is significant not only because it concedes that the hijackers did not reveal their intentions, but also because the subsequent investigation, even with the benefit of hindsight, was unable to detect significant lapses in the conspirators’ counterintelligence tradecraft.Footnote 45 This, of course, was not the result of luck or circumstances beyond the control of the conspirators. On the contrary, it was the result of carefully planned activity, imbued with the hijackers’ adherence to Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft. The protection afforded by these measures allowed the hijackers to conduct their activity secure in the knowledge that their intentions, indeed, their very existence, was unknown to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community. By ensuring that their defensive measures were in place, the hijackers were free to pursue their operational objectives with confidence, and as it turned out, impunity. Counterintelligence, therefore, fulfilled a function similar to that of operational intelligence through its ability to reduce the level of perceived and actual risk and by providing the organization a significant degree of control over the direction and outcome of the operation. Ultimately, the effect of counterintelligence was to facilitate Al Qaeda’s attempts to construct and execute a specific and very deliberate act of violence by removing or minimising the uncertainties normally associated with terrorist activity. Moreover, Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence practices demonstrated a level of practicality and an appreciation for the operational realities that defy notions of irrationality based on fanaticism or an inability to form accurate representations of reality. As noted earlier, it was realized very early that the success of the operation depended on an ability to construct a highly detailed and pragmatic understanding of the enemy and its methods. This intent and capability demonstrated a side to Al Qaeda at odds with theories based on terrorists’ distortion of reality for reasons stemming from internal pressures to conform,Footnote 46 the need for clandestiny,Footnote 47 or ideological zeal.Footnote 48 These theories suggest that many aspects of terrorist decision making can in turn be affected, including perceptions of the enemy, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, and the capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.Footnote 49 Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence protocols in preparation for the 9/11 attacks, however, revealed a detached objectivity that allowed it to form and respond to accurate and highly detailed assessments of its operating environment. The hijackers’ effective use of cover demonstrated a capacity to suspend their strong ideological beliefs in the interests of the operational needs and realities at the time. Contrary to notions of irrationality based on a level of fanaticism that distorts reality, the hijackers’ preparedness to “abandon” their beliefs suggests a capacity to think tactically and rationally to achieve immediate and attainable ends. Indeed, this behavior tends to negate theories that terrorists’ intense ideological views, especially those with a religious orientation, inhibit their capacity to think tactically and beyond the metaphysical.Footnote 50 On the contrary, the hijackers’ preparedness to suspend these beliefs and their hostility to Western culture in the interests of maintaining a credible cover, revealed a grasp on reality, including a tactical awareness, which transcended the distorting effects of ideology. Deception, based on a detailed knowledge of the methods and mindsets of its adversaries, was thus a key counterintelligence strategy employed by Al Qaeda in its preparations for the 9/11 attacks. In fact, this deception proved so effective precisely because it was based on the hijackers’ keen knowledge of their adversaries’ own perceptions and preconceived ideas. From the utilization of operatives likely to arouse the least suspicion, to the methods used by the hijackers to enter and operate within the United States, the effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s deception and denial stemmed directly from their plausibility. Familiarity with the West was, therefore, one of the characteristics most sought after by the Al Qaeda leadership in their selection of the pilots and cell leaders.Footnote 51 This familiarity enabled the hijackers to integrate more easily into U.S. society, thereby fulfilling the crucial requirement of remaining anonymous and indistinct. These integration efforts were aided through the hijackers’ manipulation of Western stereotypical views of Islamic militants. The adoption of Western habits, including the shaving of beards and the wearing of Western clothing, were all intended to deceive and conceal. Demonstrating an ability to adapt and suspend intense ideological views in the interests of operational reality, Binalshibh described the process involved in adopting a suitable cover: Every brother would look at what suited him best in terms of cover, according to his age and educational standard, his physiognomy and the like, and he would consult with his brothers and exchange views with them, and the operation of adopting a security cover is in essence a process aimed at deceiving the security services generally and mystifying the people around him.Footnote 52 The strength of the security measures injected the operation with a level of resilience that stemmed from confidence in the robustness of these precautions. Without these measures, the ability to move forward would be under constant risk, so that uncertainty would overshadow every action, each telephone call made, and every trip undertaken. Binalshibh would subsequently explain that his role of co-ordinator for the operation was to solve the, “problems that might face the brothers in [the] cells and devising an appropriate security umbrella under which the brothers can move around.”Footnote 53 Almost every aspect of the 9/11 operation required confidence in the hijackers’ security arrangements. Confidence in these arrangements allowed the hijackers to engage in each of those activities fundamental to any operation, but each of which had the potential to expose the operatives and their intentions. The creation of a security umbrella during the various phases of the hijackers’ activities enabled them to move onto the next phase, reasonably secure in the knowledge that it was safe to do so. The hijackers’ method of entry into the United States serves as a useful example. The ability to function and make the necessary preparations in the United States during a period stretching over many months was dependent on them being able to enter the country without arousing the slightest suspicion. The security arrangements undertaken prior to their entry into the United States, therefore, proved crucial and formed a major part of Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation. These measures included the selection of hijackers with little connection with Al Qaeda.Footnote 54 Similarly, the hijackers’ confidence in the integrity of their security arrangements provided the cell leaders the self-assurance to engage in extensive travel. Travel, especially that which traverses international boundaries, is a risky activity for those engaged in illicit behavior because it brings one into contact with government officials particularly alert to the possibility of unlawful activity. The hijackers, especially the pilots, however, seemed to engage in international and domestic travel at will. Atta, for example, undertook extensive international and domestic travel in preparation for the attacks.Footnote 55 The fact that all the hijackers traveled under their real names indicates the level of confidence each had in their security arrangements and the thoroughness of preparations designed to conceal their links to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s security arrangements also protected the operation when, as a matter of necessity, it was required to engage in behavior more risky than that undertaken on a day to day basis. Communications between the hijackers and the Al Qaeda leadership is a conspicuous example. Due to the scale and importance of the 9/11 operation, the Al Qaeda leadership took an active role in directing it, insisting on regular progress reports, which included some of the results from the hijackers’ own surveillance activities.Footnote 56 This, of course, entailed significant risk because the lines of communication required to achieve this (between leadership, coordinator, cell leaders, and operatives) had the potential to expose almost all elements involved in the operation.Footnote 57 Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft, however, meant that this communication could proceed confident that it would not be exposed. Indeed, Binalshibh explained that he considered communications as, “the dangerous security gap through which the enemy could infiltrate and attempt to foil any operation. Therefore, it was imperative that the network establish the most secure means of communication. …  it was imperative to have, “simplicity in the language of communication and sophistication in the method of communication.”Footnote 58 The confidence inspired by Al Qaeda’s security arrangements manifested itself in other ways, encouraging activity that might have been avoided in the absence of thorough counterintelligence measures. These measures, for example, allowed the hijackers to undertake flight training in the United States, despite the risks involved. For instance, conducting training in the United States exposed the hijackers to additional risk for a number of reasons. First, this training extended significantly the amount of time the hijackers were required to spend in the United States, all the while exposing them to the risk of detection. Second, a group of Middle Eastern males conducting flight training was more likely to attract unwanted attention in the United States than if this training was conducted elsewhere, for example some place in the Arab world or in a country less sensitive to the threat of Islamic-based terrorism. Third, conducting flight training within the target country increased the likelihood of the security services identifying the group’s intentions and methods. This became a matter for concern to bin Laden as the date for the attacks neared and anxiety levels increased. Bin Laden’s unease was such that he pressed for the attacks to occur as soon as possible, concerned by the large number of operatives in the United States at the time.Footnote 59 In reality, this training could have been undertaken almost anywhere else in the world. Binalshibh claimed that the reasons for conducting this training in the United States were financial and weather related.Footnote 60 These reasons appear insignificant, however, given the scale and importance of the planned operation. The preparedness of the Al Qaeda leadership to allow flight training to occur in the United States merely for the reasons mentioned by Binalshibh is suggestive of strong confidence in those security arrangements already in place and those that would follow. The confidence engendered by Al Qaeda’s security measures also contributed to the operation’s resilience. The strength of these measures meant that when unanticipated problems arose, especially those that risked exposing the operation, the organizers and cell leaders felt confident enough to proceed with the plot. The robustness of the plot was such that George Tenet considered the operation’s resilience one of its defining features.Footnote 61 This was evident in a number of areas. For example, in the days leading up to the attacks, three of the hijackers received speeding tickets from local law enforcement. Remaining calm, they did not arouse any suspicion, presumably because they were sufficiently confident in the integrity of the security arrangements put into place up to that time.Footnote 62 The police officer who intercepted Ziad Jarrah later reflected that Jarrah’s demeanor did not warrant further investigation, commenting that he, “was extremely calm and cooperative throughout the entire traffic stop.”Footnote 63 In fact, some of the hijackers’ level of confidence was such that they initiated contact with law enforcement. Atta’s second-in-command, Nawaf al-Hazmi, for instance, reported an attempted street robbery to Virginia Police on 1 May 2001, just four and a half months before the attacks.Footnote 64 Aftermath Kepel, in his study of political Islam, described the 9/11 attacks as, “ … a seismic event with incalculable consequences.”Footnote 65 This observation, and others like it,Footnote 66 captures the dramatic and far-reaching implications of the attacks. For Al Qaeda, the impact was no less dramatic. These carefully constructed and choreographed attacks, with their tremendous symbolic significance, revealed to multiple audiences Al Qaeda’s worldview centered on the existence of a struggle between the forces of good and evil. Moreover, the attacks were planned to convey the power and righteousness of Al Qaeda’s cause, while demonstrating the vulnerability of the U.S. government and all that it represents. By discrediting U.S. power in this way, Al Qaeda sought to establish the supremacy of its ideology in what it considers to be a world at war.Footnote 67 Indeed, the Al Qaeda leadership in the post-9/11 period emphasized the capacity for the mujahidin to achieve victory despite the strength of those forces massed against them. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States, despite its “great power” status, was presented as a country particularly susceptible to military defeat.Footnote 68 In fact, Al Qaeda’s successful use of intelligence and counterintelligence represented an impressive display of power in its own right. These activities, especially counterintelligence, exemplified the capacity of the organization to challenge the authority of the United States by overcoming its intelligence services, one of the most recognizable symbols of American power. By demonstrating such vulnerability, Al Qaeda further weakened perceptions of U.S. power while strengthening images of its own omnipotence and the righteousness of its cause. Moreover, this fulfilled a more practical role insofar as it provided evidence that the United States and its intelligence services could be defeated. For instance, Binalshibh, in reference to the 9/11 attacks, would comment that, “[p]eople are often morally defeated. … They have a complex towards the CIA and Mossad but why should they when Allah has instilled this nation with the duty of jihad, as we see [from the example] of these rare heroic and courageous operations?”Footnote 69 Similarly, al-Hakaymah’s Myth of Delusion observed that the 9/11 attacks, “… exposed to the world the myth of delusion called ‘NSA-CIA-FBI.’ They used to say that ‘if a mouse entered America or came out of it, you should be able to find a report about it in the archives of the American intelligence services.’ The American intelligence lost this round against al-Qaeda intelligence.”Footnote 70 In fact, presenting images of a David and Goliath struggle that can be won is central not only to Al Qaeda’s attempt to demonstrate the power of its ideology, the heroism of its operatives, and the reach of the organization, but also to inspire others who might be discouraged by the apparent omnipotence of the United States and those countries aligned with it. Presenting images of almost insurmountable odds has a solid basis in Islamic history, a fact that Al Qaeda routinely exploits to arouse and mobilize its supporters.Footnote 71 The effects of the 9/11 attacks, however, were meant to be more than just symbolic. Although emphasizing the existence of a global struggle based on a dichotomous worldview was central to Al Qaeda’s planning and objectives, the tangible and worldly goals it hoped to achieve through this symbolism were no less important. For instance, the attacks served to propel the organization onto the world stage, drawing global attention to its grievances,Footnote 72 at least some of which are rooted in reality and have political solutions.Footnote 73 Moreover, the images of power and war generated by the attacks were intended to radicalize and mobilize supporters by offering an example of a successful operation achieved through methodical planning, personal sacrifice, and submission to the will of God.Footnote 74 Conclusion The 9/11 attacks provide strong evidence of the capacity of intelligence and counterintelligence to lead to outcomes consistent with Al Qaeda’s strategic and symbolic objectives. These critical operational tools allowed Al Qaeda to accurately evaluate its operating environment and construct plans that could lead to a carefully crafted and choreographed act of violence. These plans were firmly rooted in an understanding of the target and its milieu acquired through methodical intelligence collection. In particular, intelligence provided a level of familiarity with the target that ensured surprise or unanticipated circumstances would be kept to an absolute minimum. By attempting to replicate the conditions likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ dry-runs and intelligence probes established in great detail and precision aircraft and airport security procedures and the likely reactions by airline staff to specific events, while also creating a strong sense of environmental familiarity. The planners’ and hijackers’ predicative capabilities were, therefore, enhanced significantly by the operation’s intelligence preparations. In assembling their plans for the take-over of the aircraft, the operational leaders could construct specific responses and assign roles in anticipation that events would unfold as the intelligence indicated they would. For instance, knowledge that the cockpit doors would be opened shortly after take-off precluded the need to smuggle on board weapons other than box cutters. The need to resort to weapons more sophisticated or deadly was deemed unnecessary because access to the cockpit was unlikely to meet with the type of resistance that would require weapons other than box cutters. Furthermore, knowledge that these doors were routinely opened during the very early stages of each of the flights formed the basis of the hijackers’ intention to crash all aircraft in a coordinated, almost simultaneous series of attacks. Knowing that these doors would be opened 10 to 15 minutes into each flight provided a window of opportunity in which access could be gained to cockpits at approximately the same time. Indeed, this was considered so important that Binalshibh claimed that if the hijackers could not gain control of the cockpit during this critical period, then they would abandon their attempt to seize the aircraft.Footnote 75 Moreover, the hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence and counterintelligence lends substantial support to theories of terrorist rationality, including those that employ suicide as a tactic and strategy.Footnote 76 Despite their preparedness to die, the hijackers’ use of intelligence and counterintelligence demonstrated a desire to avoid death until the planned moment. The hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence, despite their intention to die and their intense ideological views, demonstrated a desire to maintain their grasp on reality and to be guided by the operational realities on which a successful outcome depended. This goal-oriented behavior, and the postponing of death to coi…
@mikenov: IS KSM THE "MASTERMIND"? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Unreliable Confessions. Much of the detailed narrative regarding KSM’s "A-to-Z" role comes from his own admissions while in U.S. custody. While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM)

@mikenov: IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Unreliable Confessions. Much of the detailed narrative regarding KSM’s “A-to-Z” role comes from his own admissions while in U.S. custody. While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM)

IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadUnreliable Confessions. Much of the detailed narrative regarding KSM’s “A-to-Z” role comes from his own admissions while in U.S. custody. While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, historians, legal analysts, and counterterrorism investigators have raised several arguments that challenge or nuance his exclusive title as the “mastermind.” The arguments against viewing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the 9/11 “Mastermind” – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+argu…
@mikenov: IS KSM THE "MASTERMIND"? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, hist

@mikenov: IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, hist

IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadWhile Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, historians, legal analysts, and counterterrorism investigators have raised several arguments that challenge or nuance his exclusive title as the “mastermind.” The arguments against viewing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the 9/11 “Mastermind” – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+argu…
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. "No evidence" - does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadWho trained the 9/11 hijackers? Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel – Google Search google.com/search?q=the9%2F1…Or all three together. Search: double agents
@mikenov: Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. "No evidence" - does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the

@mikenov: Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the

Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadUsually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel – Google Search google.com/search?q=the9%2F1…Search: double agents

@mikenov: Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers f

Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from
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All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – 10.11.26

 All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED

9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED

Articles, Blog, and TweetsArticles, Blog, and Tweets47 min ago@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google SearchArticles, Blog, and Tweets56 min ago@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google SearchArticles, Blog, and Tweets1 hrs ago@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticatedThe News And Times Information Network – Blogs By Michael Novakhov – thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com
The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda's Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Michael_Novakhov shared this story. Abstract The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were undoubtedly the most brazen and shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history. Al Qaeda’s capacity to achieve this outcome depended in large part on its meticulous intelligence and counterintelligence preparations. These activities allowed Al Qaeda to exert a strong measure of control over its operating environment, leading to a confidence that events would unfold as planned. Moreover, intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to form highly accurate and realistic assessments of its environment, an outcome that helps to dispel notions of an organization consumed by a level of fanaticism that distorts its perception of reality, or else frustrates its capacity to engage in rational decision making. This article examines Al Qaeda’s use of intelligence and counterintelligence using the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001 (hereinafter, “the 9/11 attacks”) as a case study. It will trace Al Qaeda’s collection and use of operational intelligence, with particular emphasis on how this intelligence may have influenced a range of operational decisions and how it may provide evidence of Al Qaeda’s rational approach to decision making. The use of intelligence influenced critical elements of the operation, so that various key decisions were directly determined by operational intelligence accumulated over a lengthy period. This article will analyze how those involved in the operation, including both the operatives and the leadership that directed and coordinated it, craved high levels of certainty and operational control. It will examine the idea that this search for certainty was largely satiated by the organization’s extensive use of intelligence. Aligning decisions to accommodate the conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation served to maximize Al Qaeda’s chance of achieving operational success. Similarly, counterintelligence allowed for the creation of a security umbrella that shielded the operation from exposure throughout all its stages. The nature of the operation dictated the need for the hijackers to engage in behavior that exposed them to constant risk. From communications between the various levels involved in the planning and execution of the operation, to the extensive travel and preparation undertaken by the hijackers, each activity was fraught with danger. This article will critically investigate the proposition that counterintelligence allowed the hijackers to function with confidence during each of these activities, secure in the knowledge that the operation had not been compromised and that they maintained the crucial element of surprise. This case study will, therefore, seek to examine the extent to which intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to engage in decision making based on accurate representations of reality rather than false illusions influenced by strong ideological or dogmatic perceptions of the world. Moreover, it will examine the argument that Al Qaeda’s intelligence and counterintelligence preparations for the operation may be suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the means–ends logic that exemplify most explanations of terrorist rationality.Footnote 1 For example, attempts to manipulate the terrorists’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and very specific intelligence suggests a desire to base decisions on near-complete information, not just that which was immediately presented to the group. Intelligence collection on this level was intended to allow Al Qaeda to carry out operations without encountering the type of unanticipated outcomes that could lead to operational failure or blunt the impact of its political or ideological message. Just because events would demonstrate that Al Qaeda was unable to achieve an outcome as resounding as this does not diminish the rationality of its decision making or the role intelligence was expected to discharge in this process. In this way, this study will fill a significant gap in the understanding of the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although some effort has previously been made to examine the counterintelligence protocols of Al Qaeda during the operation,Footnote 2 no attempt has been made to assess the role of intelligence in these events. In neither case, however, has there been a serious attempt to contextualize the function of intelligence and counterintelligence as key activities within Al Qaeda’s decision-making process. Although descriptions of intelligence and counterintelligence in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks routinely stress their operational importance, analyses linking these activities to decision making and the organization’s capacity to engage in rational behavior appear non-existent. Operational Intelligence An analysis of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation demonstrates that the strength of its contribution resided in two areas, namely that of assisting in the preparation of a detailed plan, and to a lesser extent, target identification. It will be demonstrated that Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation were designed to uncover as much detail as possible about their targets and operating environment to optimize the likelihood of operational success. An examination of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation will be served best by examining two distinct phases to the operation, those of conceptualization and planning.Footnote 3 These phases clearly delineate the impact of intelligence on Al Qaeda decision making at critical junctures of the operation’s evolution, while also demonstrating the considered, deliberate, and methodical approach that characterized a decision-making process that spanned years. Revealing a clear capacity to calculate costs and benefits, frequently with the assistance of detailed intelligence, Al Qaeda during these phases displayed the hallmarks of a rational organization that engaged in reflective rather than impulsive decision making designed to achieve an act of violence of tremendous strategic and symbolic importance.Footnote 4 Conceptualization To understand the role of intelligence in facilitating the 9/11 operation, it is first necessary to analyze its genesis as an idea. Such an examination will demonstrate that intelligence fulfilled a limited role during the earliest phases of the operation when discussion focused on the method of attack and preferred targets. It will be contended, however, that the operation’s conception at the apex of the Al Qaeda hierarchy, along with the formulation of a tentative strategy, precluded a need for the type of detailed intelligence that normally determines these fundamental questions. It will be demonstrated that by the time the Al Qaeda leadership approved the operation, the method of attack, along with at least some of the targets, had, for years, formed part of the thinking of those central to the operation. As the following discussion will show, the historical development of the 9/11 operation facilitated a refining process that transformed it from an ambitious idea into reality. The driving force behind the 9/11 operation was Kuwaiti-born Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereafter “Khalid”). By the time Khalid presented his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership for what would ultimately become the 9/11 operation (known within Al Qaeda as the “planes operation”), and prior to his membership of the organization, he had already demonstrated a keen interest in the use of aircraft for terrorist attacks. In the most well-known and ambitious of these plans, the “Bojinka” plot, Khalid and others planned to bomb twelve U.S. commercial aircraft over the Pacific during a two-day period.Footnote 5 Working with his nephew and principal plotter behind the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef, Khalid played an active role in this, his first terrorist operation.Footnote 6 This multifaceted plot also involved a plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his planned visit to the Philippines in January 1995. It seems to have been Yousef’s idea to use co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad, a trained pilot, to fly a light aircraft over the route to be taken by the Pope and drop bombs over the side.Footnote 7 At this time, Murad also contemplated flying a light aircraft loaded with chemical weapons into CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.Footnote 8 This idea emerged in casual conversation between Murad and Yousef, and no specific plan for its execution was devised.Footnote 9 At about this time, Khalid and Yousef also developed a plan to bomb U.S.-bound cargo flights by placing jackets containing nitrocellulose on board.Footnote 10 Thus, Khalid demonstrated a consistent pattern of behavior and interest, at the center of which lay the use of aircraft to attack U.S. interests. Significantly, Jack Roche informed this author that when he met Khalid for the first time in early 2000, the latter asked Roche whether the United States and Israel operated commercial aircraft out of Australia. Although this was not taken any further, Roche believes that Khalid was scouting for targets within Australia.Footnote 11 The idea of using hijacked aircraft as weapons also extended to senior members of Al Qaeda, even before Khalid put forward his proposal for the planes operation. It is believed that Mohammed Atef, at that time Al Qaeda’s operational commander, conducted a study in 1996 that concluded that traditional hijackings failed to meet the organization’s goal of inflicting mass casualties.Footnote 12 The study reportedly considered the feasibility of hijacking aircraft and blowing them up in flight. Thus, the idea of using aircraft had some precedence within Al Qaeda, and among others on the periphery of the organization, that would ultimately perform a central role in the 9/11 operation. Furthermore, it was apparent that the use of aircraft, especially in an unconventional sense, was seen as a vulnerability to existing security arrangements. Indeed, Khalid considered the use of aircraft a more effective and less problematic form of attack compared to conventional bombing methods, a lesson he claims to have learnt from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. With this in mind, he and Yousef considered using aircraft as weapons in attacks on targets that included the World Trade Center, and, as discussed earlier, CIA headquarters.Footnote 13 Unable to realize his ambitions of carrying out an operation involving the use of aircraft on his own, Khalid was given an opportunity in mid-1996 to present his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership.Footnote 14 During the course of this meeting, Khalid proposed an operation involving trained pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States.Footnote 15 Although bin Laden remained non-committal, he agreed, two years later, to support Khalid’s proposal. Over a series of meetings involving bin Laden, Khalid, and Mohammed Atef in early 1999, it was decided that the initial list of targets would include the White House, the U.S. Capitol Building, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.Footnote 16 It is not known how detailed and involved these discussions were, and whether this list included other targets that were subsequently rejected for unknown reasons. Furthermore, it is not clear if intelligence was consulted in any comprehensive way during this initial period. It is plausible, however, that the suggested method of the attack precluded the need for intelligence at this stage because the use of aircraft as “flying bombs” exposed virtually every potential U.S. target to attack. In other words, the difficulties associated with conventional bombing methods in terms of ground security could be overcome through the use of aircraft. The Al Qaeda leadership was thus free to choose the targets it wanted, being guided almost entirely by the “statement” it wished to make through the attacks. Indeed, this appears to have been the sole consideration at this time, with the World Trade Center seen as symbolic of U.S. economic power, the Pentagon, a symbol of its military power, the U.S. Capitol as emblematic of U.S. policy on Israel, and the White House, a symbol of general U.S. political power.Footnote 17 In time, however, intelligence would reveal problems specific to this method of attack. It would appear that these problems were identified only after the hijackers engaged in reconnaissance flights. In this regard, intelligence fulfilled its intended function by identifying circumstances that could be expected to impact on the likelihood of operational success. By replicating conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ intelligence collection efforts were successful in identifying impediments not anticipated by the Al Qaeda leadership at the time of target selection. The indecision over whether to strike at the White House or the Capitol Building emerged only after the hijackers’ intelligence activities made it apparent that attacking the White House would be more problematic than initially anticipated. Indeed, it seems likely that Mohammed Atta was given some latitude over target selection, because the number of targets that formed the initial list (the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, the Capitol, and the White House) exceeded the number of aircraft to be hijacked.Footnote 18 It may, therefore, be presumed that Atta was to prioritize these targets.Footnote 19 Although it is not clear on what basis they were to be prioritized, there are strong indications that intelligence played some role in this process. From the outset of the “planes operation,” bin Laden was determined to attack the White House, emphasizing his preference on a number of occasions.Footnote 20 In May 2001, for example, bin Laden met with operations coordinator Ramzi Binalshibh, instructing him to confirm that Atta understood that bin Laden’s preference was for the White House over the Capitol. Atta, however, clearly had problems with bin Laden’s continued preference for the White House. Atta informed Binalshibh on at least two separate occasions that he considered the White House too difficult a target.Footnote 21 It is not clear why Atta considered the White House a difficult target, although Khalid’s 2002 comment to journalist Yosri Fouda that reconnaissance teams dismissed it for “navigation reasons,” may be close to the truth. According to Khalid, the small size of the White House made it difficult to see from the air, while the strong defenses surrounding the building made it a less attractive target than the Capitol.Footnote 22 Despite these difficulties, Atta informed Binalshibh that he had tasked Hazmi and Hanjour to conduct reconnaissance on the White House to evaluate the feasibility of an attack, and was apparently awaiting their answer at the time of Atta’s meeting with Binalshibh. Atta also indicated at this time that these two operatives had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of the Pentagon.Footnote 23 It therefore seems clear from events that a process was in place to conduct intelligence activities designed to refine the target list with a view to maximizing the likelihood of operational success. Although it is true that the role of intelligence in this process was minor compared to operations such as that of the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya in 1998, it is nevertheless indicative of a deliberate and considered approach to decision making in which the weighing of the possibilities and likely outcomes was determined by intelligence. It is also plausible that other intelligence was consulted in deciding on the preferred targets. Dhiren Barot and his associates were actively engaged in reconnaissance in the United States some time after the Al Qaeda leadership approved the “planes operation.” It is known that Barot entered the United States in August 2000 and again in March 2001, and that during these visits travelled to New York and Washington, D.C.Footnote 24 Barot may have scouted potential targets for the “planes operation,” in addition to those that became the subject of his casing reports. Indeed, Khalid confirmed that during the planning for the “planes operation,” he had direct contact with Barot, sending him on at least two missions during this period.Footnote 25 Other reporting also indicates possible surveillance activity in New York before 9/11 that was considered of sufficient concern that it was included in a Presidential Daily Brief in August 2001 addressing bin Laden’s intention to attack the United States.Footnote 26 Planning By the time Khalid approached bin Laden with his idea that would become the 9/11 operation, the hijacking of aircraft was a method looking for an operation. The method of attack thus formed the essence of the operation, providing a unique mode of attack capable of circumventing existing defensive measures while also facilitating Al Qaeda’s aim of inflicting mass casualties. Intelligence during the planning phase, therefore, sought to identify vulnerabilities that would facilitate the preferred method of attack. Although the planned use of hijacked aircraft also influenced target selection by identifying vulnerabilities consistent with the method of attack (e.g., the need for buildings to be clearly visible from the air), it was during the planning phase of the operation that intelligence made its most significant contribution. Intelligence would be used to determine those details of the plan capable of facilitating the preferred method of attack in such a way as to maximize the likelihood of success. Moreover, the hijackers’ intelligence preparations were intended to achieve a high level of calculability of results by identifying security arrangements they could expect to encounter on the day of the operation. This knowledge could then be used to facilitate planning capable of negating or circumventing these security arrangements. Binalshibh would subsequently convey the thoroughness of these intelligence activities when he commented that the hijackers studied, “the security arrangements that [were] adopted at all the airports and establish[ed] a comprehensive picture about the procedures at all the airports and also unravel[ed] the security loopholes that exist at these airports … [and found] out the trips that depart and arrive at these airports … [as well as] the level of security at these airports.”Footnote 27 Within months of receiving permission to proceed with the attack, Khalid took the first steps in assembling the body of intelligence that would make the attacks possible. Relying on open source intelligence, Khalid compiled data from Western aviation magazines, telephone directories for U.S. cities, airline timetables, and conducted Internet searches on U.S. flight schools. This intelligence was supplemented by flight simulator software and information gleaned from movies depicting hijackings.Footnote 28 Some of these early intelligence efforts may have been an attempt to generate ideas and identify possible vulnerabilities. Familiarity with the enemy’s methods and culture was also deemed important at this early stage, as was the need to provide the suicide operatives the basic skills and knowledge to function in an unfamiliar and hostile environment. Khalid, therefore, organized a short course for the operatives in Karachi, which included techniques on how to conduct reconnaissance on flights. Although rudimentary in nature, these instructions proved critical in bringing the attack to fruition by encouraging the operatives to probe for vulnerabilities in the routine behavior of the flight crew. These instructions included the need to observe cabin doors during take-off and landing, whether the captain exited the cockpit during the flight, and at what stage, and using what methods, flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.Footnote 29 It was not long after that actual casing flights took place with the purpose of probing for weaknesses in airport security arrangements, and ascertaining the feasibility of elements of the plan as they stood at that point in time. One of the suicide operatives in particular, Khallad, engaged in intelligence activity with these ends in mind. For example, he flew from Bangkok to Hong Kong in early January 2000 on board a U.S. airliner, seating himself in first class. This casing flight would prove instructive because it identified problems perhaps not anticipated by the operation’s planners. For instance, Khallad was unable to view the cockpit from his seat. He also probed airport security by carrying a box cutter onto the aircraft in his toiletries bag. He subsequently removed this bag from his carry-on luggage, observing that flight staff paid no attention.Footnote 30 The hijackers conducted further intelligence activity after their arrival in the United States, again with the intention of identifying vulnerabilities capable of advancing the plan. This reconnaissance was typified by a hands-on approach designed to identify conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. In this way, the plan would enjoy a greater likelihood of success because decisions would not be based on false assumptions that could mean the difference between success and failure. Realism, not distorted notions of reality determined by powerful ideological views, served to shape operational planning. For example, it is suspected that the hijackers conducted numerous surveillance flights in an attempt to proximate as near as possible the circumstances likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. Seeking to replicate these conditions, the pilots conducted their surveillance flights while seated in first class, enabling them to monitor the cockpit and also observe firsthand the activities in first class on a transcontinental flight similar to the one that they would take on 11 September. Each also conducted their surveillance flight on the same type of aircraft he would pilot on the day of the hijackings, thereby injecting further realism into the surveillance process.Footnote 31 On the basis of the surveillance flights, Atta informed Binalshibh in July 2001 that the best time to storm the cockpit was 10 to 15 minutes after take-off when the cockpit was normally opened for the first time.Footnote 32 It is also plausible that the hijackers compared the results of their surveillance activity for the purpose of identifying behavior common to their flights, thus permitting the identification of routines susceptible to exploitation. In keeping with the hijackers’ desire to engage in activity closely replicating the conditions expected during the day of the operation, some pilots also took practice flights near some of their targets. For instance, Hani Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi (American Airlines Flight 77, which was flown into the Pentagon) rented a plane and traveled a route close to Washington, D.C.Footnote 33 It is significant that Jarrah and Hanjour also took separate training flights along the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude route along the Hudson River that passed by landmarks such as the World Trade Center. In fact, the Hudson Corridor would have provided the pilots an excellent view of the World Trade Center towers, and at the time was open to uncontrolled aircraft flying below 1,200 feet.Footnote 34 Atta also informed Binalshibh that he, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah carried box cutters onto their surveillance flights, encountering no problems. These surveillance flights were so successful that Atta informed Binalshibh that he would not need other weapons, and that he was so confident the cockpit doors would be opened that he did not consider contingency plans.Footnote 35 This represents an important example of the ability of intelligence to elevate terrorist confidence levels by helping to establish operational certainty. In an attempt to explore alternate means of gaining access to the cockpit, the hijackers’ intelligence probes went beyond that of passive observation. For instance, it was reported that on 1 August 2001, Abdulaziz Alomari boarded a flight from Las Vegas to New York. Before taking off, Alomari made an attempt to secure a ride in the cockpit’s jump seat all the way to New York, on the pretext that he was on the verge of flying for Egypt Air. After being shown to the cockpit, it became apparent to the crew that Alomari was not what he claimed to be and was asked to leave the cockpit prior to take-off. During the course of the flight, he told a flight attendant that he left his pen in the cockpit and, therefore, needed to return to the flight deck. He was told that he would not be able to return to the cockpit, especially while the aircraft was in flight.Footnote 36 These highly developed intelligence collection methods were suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the simple means–ends logic that characterizes most explanations of terrorist rationality. Attempts to manipulate the hijackers’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and accurate intelligence suggest a desire to attain near-perfect intelligence in which chance would play a negligible role. To those within the law enforcement and intelligence community with even a rudimentary knowledge of Al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad, the attacks on 9/11 could hardly have been a strategic surprise.Footnote 37 Al Qaeda’s enmity toward the United States and its desire to carry out an attack on U.S. soil was well known prior to 9/11.Footnote 38 Al Qaeda had already declared, in 1998, that it was in a state of war with the United States. Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa in which he urges jihad against Americans is unambiguous, declaring that the killing of, “… the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it…”Footnote 39 This was, in turn, followed by attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa (August 1998)Footnote 40 and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (October 2000). Furthermore, the arrest of Ahmed Ressam on the U.S.–Canadian border in December 1999 was a clear indication of Al Qaeda’s intention of bringing its war to the United States. This pattern of behavior was preceded by the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the planned attacks on prominent New York landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel, which, although not Al Qaeda inspired or organized, were certainly indicative of the dawning of a brand of Islamic militancy intent on striking directly at the United States. This strategic warning was supplemented by tactical intelligence revealing the possibility of a terrorist strike in the period leading up to 9/11.Footnote 41 Indeed, the perceived threat from Al Qaeda was such that the collection of intelligence on Al Qaeda became a high priority for U.S. intelligence and the White House in the two years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although arguments persist about whether the U.S. intelligence community pursued Al Qaeda with sufficient vigor in this period, it is clear that Al Qaeda was an important target whose capabilities and intentions were well known.Footnote 42 The Director of Central Intelligence at the time of the attacks, George Tenet, acknowledged this state of war, observing, “ … even before September 2001, we knew we faced a foe that is committed, resilient and has operational depth. The Intelligence Community was already at war with al-Qaida.”Footnote 43 Despite these indicators, the 9/11 hijackers were able to avoid detection, even though the first hijackers arrived in the United States 20 months before the attacks. The effectiveness of their counterintelligence tradecraft was such that Tenet informed the Joint Inquiry investigating the 9/11 attacks that, “[b]ased on what we know today, the investigation of the 9/11 attacks has revealed no major slip in the conspirators’ operational security.”Footnote 44 This statement is significant not only because it concedes that the hijackers did not reveal their intentions, but also because the subsequent investigation, even with the benefit of hindsight, was unable to detect significant lapses in the conspirators’ counterintelligence tradecraft.Footnote 45 This, of course, was not the result of luck or circumstances beyond the control of the conspirators. On the contrary, it was the result of carefully planned activity, imbued with the hijackers’ adherence to Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft. The protection afforded by these measures allowed the hijackers to conduct their activity secure in the knowledge that their intentions, indeed, their very existence, was unknown to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community. By ensuring that their defensive measures were in place, the hijackers were free to pursue their operational objectives with confidence, and as it turned out, impunity. Counterintelligence, therefore, fulfilled a function similar to that of operational intelligence through its ability to reduce the level of perceived and actual risk and by providing the organization a significant degree of control over the direction and outcome of the operation. Ultimately, the effect of counterintelligence was to facilitate Al Qaeda’s attempts to construct and execute a specific and very deliberate act of violence by removing or minimising the uncertainties normally associated with terrorist activity. Moreover, Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence practices demonstrated a level of practicality and an appreciation for the operational realities that defy notions of irrationality based on fanaticism or an inability to form accurate representations of reality. As noted earlier, it was realized very early that the success of the operation depended on an ability to construct a highly detailed and pragmatic understanding of the enemy and its methods. This intent and capability demonstrated a side to Al Qaeda at odds with theories based on terrorists’ distortion of reality for reasons stemming from internal pressures to conform,Footnote 46 the need for clandestiny,Footnote 47 or ideological zeal.Footnote 48 These theories suggest that many aspects of terrorist decision making can in turn be affected, including perceptions of the enemy, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, and the capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.Footnote 49 Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence protocols in preparation for the 9/11 attacks, however, revealed a detached objectivity that allowed it to form and respond to accurate and highly detailed assessments of its operating environment. The hijackers’ effective use of cover demonstrated a capacity to suspend their strong ideological beliefs in the interests of the operational needs and realities at the time. Contrary to notions of irrationality based on a level of fanaticism that distorts reality, the hijackers’ preparedness to “abandon” their beliefs suggests a capacity to think tactically and rationally to achieve immediate and attainable ends. Indeed, this behavior tends to negate theories that terrorists’ intense ideological views, especially those with a religious orientation, inhibit their capacity to think tactically and beyond the metaphysical.Footnote 50 On the contrary, the hijackers’ preparedness to suspend these beliefs and their hostility to Western culture in the interests of maintaining a credible cover, revealed a grasp on reality, including a tactical awareness, which transcended the distorting effects of ideology. Deception, based on a detailed knowledge of the methods and mindsets of its adversaries, was thus a key counterintelligence strategy employed by Al Qaeda in its preparations for the 9/11 attacks. In fact, this deception proved so effective precisely because it was based on the hijackers’ keen knowledge of their adversaries’ own perceptions and preconceived ideas. From the utilization of operatives likely to arouse the least suspicion, to the methods used by the hijackers to enter and operate within the United States, the effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s deception and denial stemmed directly from their plausibility. Familiarity with the West was, therefore, one of the characteristics most sought after by the Al Qaeda leadership in their selection of the pilots and cell leaders.Footnote 51 This familiarity enabled the hijackers to integrate more easily into U.S. society, thereby fulfilling the crucial requirement of remaining anonymous and indistinct. These integration efforts were aided through the hijackers’ manipulation of Western stereotypical views of Islamic militants. The adoption of Western habits, including the shaving of beards and the wearing of Western clothing, were all intended to deceive and conceal. Demonstrating an ability to adapt and suspend intense ideological views in the interests of operational reality, Binalshibh described the process involved in adopting a suitable cover: Every brother would look at what suited him best in terms of cover, according to his age and educational standard, his physiognomy and the like, and he would consult with his brothers and exchange views with them, and the operation of adopting a security cover is in essence a process aimed at deceiving the security services generally and mystifying the people around him.Footnote 52 The strength of the security measures injected the operation with a level of resilience that stemmed from confidence in the robustness of these precautions. Without these measures, the ability to move forward would be under constant risk, so that uncertainty would overshadow every action, each telephone call made, and every trip undertaken. Binalshibh would subsequently explain that his role of co-ordinator for the operation was to solve the, “problems that might face the brothers in [the] cells and devising an appropriate security umbrella under which the brothers can move around.”Footnote 53 Almost every aspect of the 9/11 operation required confidence in the hijackers’ security arrangements. Confidence in these arrangements allowed the hijackers to engage in each of those activities fundamental to any operation, but each of which had the potential to expose the operatives and their intentions. The creation of a security umbrella during the various phases of the hijackers’ activities enabled them to move onto the next phase, reasonably secure in the knowledge that it was safe to do so. The hijackers’ method of entry into the United States serves as a useful example. The ability to function and make the necessary preparations in the United States during a period stretching over many months was dependent on them being able to enter the country without arousing the slightest suspicion. The security arrangements undertaken prior to their entry into the United States, therefore, proved crucial and formed a major part of Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation. These measures included the selection of hijackers with little connection with Al Qaeda.Footnote 54 Similarly, the hijackers’ confidence in the integrity of their security arrangements provided the cell leaders the self-assurance to engage in extensive travel. Travel, especially that which traverses international boundaries, is a risky activity for those engaged in illicit behavior because it brings one into contact with government officials particularly alert to the possibility of unlawful activity. The hijackers, especially the pilots, however, seemed to engage in international and domestic travel at will. Atta, for example, undertook extensive international and domestic travel in preparation for the attacks.Footnote 55 The fact that all the hijackers traveled under their real names indicates the level of confidence each had in their security arrangements and the thoroughness of preparations designed to conceal their links to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s security arrangements also protected the operation when, as a matter of necessity, it was required to engage in behavior more risky than that undertaken on a day to day basis. Communications between the hijackers and the Al Qaeda leadership is a conspicuous example. Due to the scale and importance of the 9/11 operation, the Al Qaeda leadership took an active role in directing it, insisting on regular progress reports, which included some of the results from the hijackers’ own surveillance activities.Footnote 56 This, of course, entailed significant risk because the lines of communication required to achieve this (between leadership, coordinator, cell leaders, and operatives) had the potential to expose almost all elements involved in the operation.Footnote 57 Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft, however, meant that this communication could proceed confident that it would not be exposed. Indeed, Binalshibh explained that he considered communications as, “the dangerous security gap through which the enemy could infiltrate and attempt to foil any operation. Therefore, it was imperative that the network establish the most secure means of communication. …  it was imperative to have, “simplicity in the language of communication and sophistication in the method of communication.”Footnote 58 The confidence inspired by Al Qaeda’s security arrangements manifested itself in other ways, encouraging activity that might have been avoided in the absence of thorough counterintelligence measures. These measures, for example, allowed the hijackers to undertake flight training in the United States, despite the risks involved. For instance, conducting training in the United States exposed the hijackers to additional risk for a number of reasons. First, this training extended significantly the amount of time the hijackers were required to spend in the United States, all the while exposing them to the risk of detection. Second, a group of Middle Eastern males conducting flight training was more likely to attract unwanted attention in the United States than if this training was conducted elsewhere, for example some place in the Arab world or in a country less sensitive to the threat of Islamic-based terrorism. Third, conducting flight training within the target country increased the likelihood of the security services identifying the group’s intentions and methods. This became a matter for concern to bin Laden as the date for the attacks neared and anxiety levels increased. Bin Laden’s unease was such that he pressed for the attacks to occur as soon as possible, concerned by the large number of operatives in the United States at the time.Footnote 59 In reality, this training could have been undertaken almost anywhere else in the world. Binalshibh claimed that the reasons for conducting this training in the United States were financial and weather related.Footnote 60 These reasons appear insignificant, however, given the scale and importance of the planned operation. The preparedness of the Al Qaeda leadership to allow flight training to occur in the United States merely for the reasons mentioned by Binalshibh is suggestive of strong confidence in those security arrangements already in place and those that would follow. The confidence engendered by Al Qaeda’s security measures also contributed to the operation’s resilience. The strength of these measures meant that when unanticipated problems arose, especially those that risked exposing the operation, the organizers and cell leaders felt confident enough to proceed with the plot. The robustness of the plot was such that George Tenet considered the operation’s resilience one of its defining features.Footnote 61 This was evident in a number of areas. For example, in the days leading up to the attacks, three of the hijackers received speeding tickets from local law enforcement. Remaining calm, they did not arouse any suspicion, presumably because they were sufficiently confident in the integrity of the security arrangements put into place up to that time.Footnote 62 The police officer who intercepted Ziad Jarrah later reflected that Jarrah’s demeanor did not warrant further investigation, commenting that he, “was extremely calm and cooperative throughout the entire traffic stop.”Footnote 63 In fact, some of the hijackers’ level of confidence was such that they initiated contact with law enforcement. Atta’s second-in-command, Nawaf al-Hazmi, for instance, reported an attempted street robbery to Virginia Police on 1 May 2001, just four and a half months before the attacks.Footnote 64 Aftermath Kepel, in his study of political Islam, described the 9/11 attacks as, “ … a seismic event with incalculable consequences.”Footnote 65 This observation, and others like it,Footnote 66 captures the dramatic and far-reaching implications of the attacks. For Al Qaeda, the impact was no less dramatic. These carefully constructed and choreographed attacks, with their tremendous symbolic significance, revealed to multiple audiences Al Qaeda’s worldview centered on the existence of a struggle between the forces of good and evil. Moreover, the attacks were planned to convey the power and righteousness of Al Qaeda’s cause, while demonstrating the vulnerability of the U.S. government and all that it represents. By discrediting U.S. power in this way, Al Qaeda sought to establish the supremacy of its ideology in what it considers to be a world at war.Footnote 67 Indeed, the Al Qaeda leadership in the post-9/11 period emphasized the capacity for the mujahidin to achieve victory despite the strength of those forces massed against them. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States, despite its “great power” status, was presented as a country particularly susceptible to military defeat.Footnote 68 In fact, Al Qaeda’s successful use of intelligence and counterintelligence represented an impressive display of power in its own right. These activities, especially counterintelligence, exemplified the capacity of the organization to challenge the authority of the United States by overcoming its intelligence services, one of the most recognizable symbols of American power. By demonstrating such vulnerability, Al Qaeda further weakened perceptions of U.S. power while strengthening images of its own omnipotence and the righteousness of its cause. Moreover, this fulfilled a more practical role insofar as it provided evidence that the United States and its intelligence services could be defeated. For instance, Binalshibh, in reference to the 9/11 attacks, would comment that, “[p]eople are often morally defeated. … They have a complex towards the CIA and Mossad but why should they when Allah has instilled this nation with the duty of jihad, as we see [from the example] of these rare heroic and courageous operations?”Footnote 69 Similarly, al-Hakaymah’s Myth of Delusion observed that the 9/11 attacks, “… exposed to the world the myth of delusion called ‘NSA-CIA-FBI.’ They used to say that ‘if a mouse entered America or came out of it, you should be able to find a report about it in the archives of the American intelligence services.’ The American intelligence lost this round against al-Qaeda intelligence.”Footnote 70 In fact, presenting images of a David and Goliath struggle that can be won is central not only to Al Qaeda’s attempt to demonstrate the power of its ideology, the heroism of its operatives, and the reach of the organization, but also to inspire others who might be discouraged by the apparent omnipotence of the United States and those countries aligned with it. Presenting images of almost insurmountable odds has a solid basis in Islamic history, a fact that Al Qaeda routinely exploits to arouse and mobilize its supporters.Footnote 71 The effects of the 9/11 attacks, however, were meant to be more than just symbolic. Although emphasizing the existence of a global struggle based on a dichotomous worldview was central to Al Qaeda’s planning and objectives, the tangible and worldly goals it hoped to achieve through this symbolism were no less important. For instance, the attacks served to propel the organization onto the world stage, drawing global attention to its grievances,Footnote 72 at least some of which are rooted in reality and have political solutions.Footnote 73 Moreover, the images of power and war generated by the attacks were intended to radicalize and mobilize supporters by offering an example of a successful operation achieved through methodical planning, personal sacrifice, and submission to the will of God.Footnote 74 Conclusion The 9/11 attacks provide strong evidence of the capacity of intelligence and counterintelligence to lead to outcomes consistent with Al Qaeda’s strategic and symbolic objectives. These critical operational tools allowed Al Qaeda to accurately evaluate its operating environment and construct plans that could lead to a carefully crafted and choreographed act of violence. These plans were firmly rooted in an understanding of the target and its milieu acquired through methodical intelligence collection. In particular, intelligence provided a level of familiarity with the target that ensured surprise or unanticipated circumstances would be kept to an absolute minimum. By attempting to replicate the conditions likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ dry-runs and intelligence probes established in great detail and precision aircraft and airport security procedures and the likely reactions by airline staff to specific events, while also creating a strong sense of environmental familiarity. The planners’ and hijackers’ predicative capabilities were, therefore, enhanced significantly by the operation’s intelligence preparations. In assembling their plans for the take-over of the aircraft, the operational leaders could construct specific responses and assign roles in anticipation that events would unfold as the intelligence indicated they would. For instance, knowledge that the cockpit doors would be opened shortly after take-off precluded the need to smuggle on board weapons other than box cutters. The need to resort to weapons more sophisticated or deadly was deemed unnecessary because access to the cockpit was unlikely to meet with the type of resistance that would require weapons other than box cutters. Furthermore, knowledge that these doors were routinely opened during the very early stages of each of the flights formed the basis of the hijackers’ intention to crash all aircraft in a coordinated, almost simultaneous series of attacks. Knowing that these doors would be opened 10 to 15 minutes into each flight provided a window of opportunity in which access could be gained to cockpits at approximately the same time. Indeed, this was considered so important that Binalshibh claimed that if the hijackers could not gain control of the cockpit during this critical period, then they would abandon their attempt to seize the aircraft.Footnote 75 Moreover, the hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence and counterintelligence lends substantial support to theories of terrorist rationality, including those that employ suicide as a tactic and strategy.Footnote 76 Despite their preparedness to die, the hijackers’ use of intelligence and counterintelligence demonstrated a desire to avoid death until the planned moment. The hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence, despite their intention to die and their intense ideological views, demonstrated a desire to maintain their grasp on reality and to be guided by the operational realities on which a successful outcome depended. This goal-oriented behavior, and the postponing of death to coincide with utility maximization, demonstrates a rationality in which suicide is employed to achieve identifiable and achievable goals. This reinforces notions that suicide terrorism is not indicative of irrationality stemming from fanaticism or an indifference to risk. Instead, the use of intelligence to maximize the benefits to be derived through suicide demonstrates deliberate and calculated behavior consistent with rational and purposive behavior. 1. See, for example, Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle, Terrorist Lives (London: Brassey’s, 1994), p. 12; Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13(1) (1981), p. 385; Andrew Silke, “Beyond Horror: Terrorist Atrocity and the Search for Understanding—The Case of the Shankill Bombing,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26(1) (2003), pp. 37–60.2. R. H. Shultz and R. M. Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai’da’s Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8(2) (2004), pp. 56–79; Devin D. Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18(3) (2006), pp. 367–388.3. George Tenet, in his testimony before the Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attack, also used these descriptors to identify the stages of the operation, along with that of execution. George J. Tenet, Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet’s Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/dci_testimony_06182002.html, 18 June 2002 (accessed 17 February 2005).4. The notion of reflective decision making is facilitated by an ideological outlook that emphasizes the importance of patience and having a long-term view to the struggle. See, for example, bin Laden’s comments in Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 33; Abdulaziz al-Moqrin, “The Group or Crew of Execution,” Al-Battar Training Camp, no. 8 (14 April 2004). In addition to fostering a sense that operations should not be rushed, and that a methodical and deliberate approach to planning will maximize the likelihood of operational success, Al Qaeda also sees other opportunities in its lengthy struggle. For instance, The Management of Savagery, in discussing the use of aggressive counterintelligence, observes that the length of battle, “ … provides an opportunity for infiltrating the adversaries and their fellow travelers and establishing a strong security apparatus that is more supportive of the security of the movement now, and later the [Islamic] state.” Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery. The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass, available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Management_of_Savagery.pdf, n.d. (accessed 12 December 2006), p. 52.5. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals (London: Andre Deutsch, 1999), pp. 71–93.6. 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 147. Khalid also played a minor role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, wiring $660 to Yousef’s co-conspirator, Mohammed Salameh. Although a minor actor only in this attack, it is important because it links Khalid to the original World Trade Center bombing and is, therefore, indicative of his historic interest in this target. Terry McDermott, Josh Meyer, and Patrick J. McDonnell, “The Plots and Designs of al Qaeda’s Engineer,” Los Angeles Times, 22 December 2002.7. Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge (New York: Regan Books, 2003), pp. 277–278; Reeve The New Jackals, p. 86.8. Reeve, The New Jackals, p. 87.9. Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge, pp. 277–278. It would subsequently emerge that Murad allegedly informed investigators from the Philippine National Police that he held discussions with Yousef about attacking the World Trade Center with hijacked commercial aircraft. It was alleged that the other targets would include the CIA, the Pentagon, a nuclear facility, and other U.S. landmarks. Other than the source from the Philippine National Police who provided this information to author Peter Lance post-9/11, the…
@mikenov: Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda's Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

@mikenov: Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks

Michael_Novakhov shared this story. AI Mode reply for Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 AttacksIn the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration.The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:1. Al-Qaeda as an Intelligent Counterintelligence ActorThe most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.The Core Thesis: Pioneered by security scholars and intelligence analysts, this perspective argues that 9/11 succeeded not because of U.S. weakness alone, but due to al-Qaeda’s superior execution of counterintelligence tradecraft.Operational Security (OPSEC): Operatives effectively integrated into Western societies by adopting Western dress, modifying social behaviors, avoiding traditional mosque networks, and employing strict compartmented communication protocols to evade electronic surveillance.Deception and Casing: Hijackers conducted sophisticated “casing flights” to map out airport vulnerabilities, study cockpit routines, and determine the exact timing needed for the hijackings, successfully exploiting open-source data without alerting airline security.2. Red Teaming and the “Alternative Analysis” of Foreign LinksFollowing the attacks, the U.S. government established internal investigative cells tasked with producing aggressive, non-consensus hypotheses—often referred to as “Red Teaming” or formal alternative intelligence analysis.The Iraq Connection Hypothesis: A controversial alternative analysis spearheaded by the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans investigated whether state actors, specifically Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi intelligence services, had provided operational support or acted as a deniable cutout for the hijackers.The Outcome: Analysts meticulously examined reports of an alleged meeting in Prague between lead hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer. This alternative hypothesis was ultimately rejected by the broader Intelligence Community (IC) and the 9/11 Commission Report due to a lack of verifiable evidence.The Sovereign Foreign Support Thesis: Ongoing alternative legal and intelligence reviews have scrutinized whether rogue elements within foreign intelligence services (such as Saudi Arabia’s GID) provided logistics, housing, and financial assistance to the first hijackers who arrived in California. While the official consensus maintains there is no evidence of top-level foreign government sponsorship, this specific vector of counterintelligence investigation remains a subject of intense professional study.3. Systematic Penetration vs. The “Bureaucratic Inertia” DebateThe standard conclusion of the 9/11 Commission was that the attacks resulted from a failure of imagination and a systemic failure to “connect the dots” across agencies. However, an alternative counterintelligence view argues that the failure was rooted in a structural exploitation of U.S. border and intelligence blind spots.Exploitation of Structural Fault Lines: This analysis focuses on how al-Qaeda deliberately exploited the strict, legally mandated barrier separating foreign intelligence collection (the CIA) from domestic law enforcement (the FBI).Counterintelligence Blind Spots: Analysts point out that when key operatives like Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar entered the U.S., they effectively slipped into a “seam” where the CIA could no longer legally track them and the FBI had not yet been properly alerted. This perspective views the intelligence failure not as passive bureaucratic laziness, but as an adversarial offensive strategy that successfully map-read and bypassed American jurisdictional boundaries.Distinguishing Counterintelligence Analysis from Conspiracy TheoriesProfessional counterintelligence analyses should not be confused with popular internet conspiracy theories:FeatureProfessional Counterintelligence AnalysisPublic Conspiracy Theories (LIHOP/MIHOP)Core ArgumentFocuses on how the adversary successfully bypassed U.S. intelligence defenses using advanced operational security.Claims the U.S. government orchestrated the attacks (“Made It Happen On Purpose”) or intentionally allowed them to happen (“Let It Happen On Purpose”).MethodologyRelies on documented case files, interrogation records, communication intercepts, and known intelligence tradecraft.Relies on misinterpreting engineering data, visual anomalies, and unverified source claims.Perception of Al-QaedaViews the terrorist network as a disciplined, capable, and strategic intelligence actor.Often dismisses al-Qaeda’s agency, treating them merely as actors or scapegoats in a larger plot.ObjectiveSeeks to reform structural gaps in border security, surveillance laws, and information sharing.Seeks to assign institutional or geopolitical blame to hidden actors.Copied to clipboardFailed to copy to clipboard. Try again later.Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and CounterintelligenceMarch 2, 2009 — This article examines Al Qaeda’s use of intelligence and counterintelligence using the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on…Council on Foreign RelationsTen Resources Debunking September 11 Conspiracy Theories | Council on Foreign RelationsSeptember 10, 2026 — The claims Snopes takes on include whether Nostradamus predicted the al-Qaeda attacks, whether thousands of Israelis were mysterio…National Security ArchiveReport of an Inquiry into the Alternative Analysis of theOctober 21, 2004 — The SSCI report identifies five primary post-9/11 finished IC products that addressed. 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@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs – Google Search google.com/search?q=Alternat…
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

Michael_Novakhov shared this story. Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBsAI Mode reply for Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBsThe massive release of declassified (PDBs) and related CIA documents significantly alters the retrospective counterintelligence (CI) lens on the September 11 attacks.For decades, the standard paradigm established by the 9/11 Commission Report framed 9/11 primarily as an “intelligence failure” rooted in a “lack of imagination” and a breakdown in agency-to-agency information sharing. However, the declassification of 71 PDB products—spanning from 1997 to 2001—fuels alternative counterintelligence analyses that pivot away from simple bureaucratic incompetence toward more acute systemic vulnerabilities.These alternative CI frameworks focus on structural blind spots, aggressive al-Qaeda deception strategies, and the ongoing debate over executive actionable warning.1. The “Long and Loud Warning” vs. Policymaker InactionThe newly declassified PDBs heavily arm an alternative framework championing the intelligence community’s performance while scrutinizing policy-level failure.The “Aircraft as a Weapon” Threat Matrix: A newly declassified brief from September 1998 explicitly warned President Bill Clinton that Osama bin Laden’s preferred option was a strike on U.S. soil, specifically cautioning that al-Qaeda “may fly an explosive-packed airplane into a US city”. Subsequent briefs detailed al-Qaeda operatives experimenting with chemical agents, conducting dry runs to bypass U.S. airport security, and actively training for commercial hijackings.The CI Implication: This dismantles the historical narrative that using planes as missiles was completely unimagined by analysts before 9/11. Under this analysis, the failure was not the generation of strategic intelligence but the “paradox of prevention.” Analysts provided consistent, high-frequency warnings, but policymakers failed to implement defensive domestic countermeasures because the alerts lacked tactical coordinates (exact times and flight numbers).2. Al-Qaeda as an Intelligence and Counterintelligence ActorTraditional histories treat al-Qaeda as a radicalized, non-state asymmetric threat operating on fanatical devotion. Alternative academic and counterintelligence analyses reframe the group as a highly disciplined intelligence outfit that successfully executed a hostile denied-area operation.Active Operational Security (OPSEC): Al-Qaeda utilized sophisticated counterintelligence measures to blind the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). According to academic CI reviews, the hijackers weaponized Western open-source data to map structural vulnerabilities, adopted Western lifestyles to blend into domestic populations, and adhered to rigorous, compartmented communication silence.Exploiting the Law Enforcement Bias: Al-Qaeda recognized that the FBI treated terrorism through a retrospective, law-enforcement lens (building criminal cases after an event) rather than a forward-looking counterintelligence or preventative paradigm. By launching an operation entirely within U.S. borders using legal visas, they slipped into a jurisdiction where the CIA was legally barred from operating and the FBI was culturally ill-equipped to track them proactively.3. The Structural Blind Spots: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) DeficitsAlternative CI critiques point to a profound institutional rot regarding how the CIA and FBI cultivated assets in the late 1990s.The Vulnerability in the PDBs: The declassified documents reveal that a July 3, 1998 PDB explicitly flagged information regarding a domestic strike but categorized it as coming from “highly questionable sources,” though concluding a strike was still “plausible”.The CI Implication: Analysts were forced to build high-level presidential briefings out of sparse, fragmented, and unverified data. The and subsequent CI evaluations note that the U.S. had zero deep penetration of al-Qaeda’s inner shura (council). The IC relied heavily on liaison intelligence (foreign partner agencies) that often carried alternative geopolitical agendas or lacked accuracy, completely blinding the U.S. to the tactical execution of the plot.Direct Comparison of Analytical FrameworksDimensionStandard “Intelligence Failure” Narrative (9/11 Commission)Alternative Counterintelligence AnalysesPrimary FailureBureaucratic silos; CIA and FBI did not share information or “connect the dots”.Defensive paralysis; failure of policymakers to execute domestic defenses despite explicit warnings.The PDB ContextThe August 6, 2001 PDB (“Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US”) was an isolated, largely historical warning.The August 6 PDB was the 36th item that year, following a multi-year trail of explicit “aircraft-as-weapon” briefs.Assessment of Al-QaedaA decentralized network of religious extremists executing an asymmetric suicide attack.A competent intelligence adversary that ran highly secure OPSEC and mapped U.S. jurisdictional seams.Strategic SolutionStructural reorganization (e.g., creating the Director of National Intelligence and NCTC).A shift from reactive law-enforcement prosecution to aggressive, forward-looking human counterintelligence.Summary TakeawayThe declassified PDBs show that the CIA provided explicit, repetitive, and severe strategic warnings—even predicting the mechanism of using explosive-laden aircraft against American cities years prior to the event. Alternative counterintelligence analyses conclude that 9/11 was less a failure of analyst imagination and more a failure of structural domestic defense, demonstrating how an agile adversary can weaponize open democratic systems against a government bound by rigid bureaucratic and geographic constraints.AI can make mistakes, so double-check responses Copied to clipboardFailed to copy to clipboard. Try again later.Declassified Intelligence Reveals Extensive 9/11 … – WSJSeptember 11, 2026 — The 9/11 Commission, which reviewed the now-declassified memos, spread the blame ・ was a lack of imagination ・ related to 9/11 eve…CIA Releases President’s Daily Briefs in Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of 9/11 – CIASeptember 11, 2026 — Today, Director John Ratcliffe declassified 71 President’s Daily Brief (PDB) products in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of …Council on Foreign RelationsTop Ten Findings of the CIA Inspector General’s Report on 9/11 | Council on Foreign RelationsJune 16, 2015 — of al-Qaeda/UBL. Analysts focused on operational support (30-50% time) over long-range analysis; alternative analysis was absent.CIA Releases President’s Daily Briefs in Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of 9/11 – CIASeptember 11, 2026 — Agency makes public more than 70 intelligence products in historic. Agency’s single largest release of declassified CIA PDB produc…THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT4 transcontinental flights hijacked by 19 terrorists. NORAD/FAA: Interception/defense protocols unsuited; response improvised.‘The attack would have been prevented’: co-author of 9/11 report reflects on missed opportunities | September 11 2001 | The GuardianSeptember 9, 2021 — Concluded that better intelligence sharing between agencies like the FBI and CIA could have prevented the attacks, and found no ev…Facebook·Valley News LiveThe CIA has declassified 71 Presidential Daily Brief documents …Sep 11, 2026 — The CIA declassified 71 Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) spanning from 1997 to 2001, revealing years of warnings regarding Osama b…Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and CounterintelligenceMarch 2, 2009 — Al Qaeda’s operational success on 9/11 relied on meticulous intelligence and counterintelligence rather than irrational fanaticism…Declassified CIA documents show clear warnings to presidents before 9/11September 11, 2026 — bin Laden’s militants were training to hijack commercial airliners, experimenting with crude chemical or other unconventional weap…CIA declassifies dozens of never-before-seen intelligence reports related to 9/11 – CBS NewsSeptember 11, 2026 — Sept 1998 (warned extremists might fly explosive-packed plane into a US city); July 2001 (imminent operation postponed);The CIA on Friday released its largest-ever batch of …September 12, 2026 — September 1998 brief warning that Osama … al-Qaeda may fly an explosive packed airplane into a US city the documents show both the…HARVARD Kennedy School – Belfer CenterReport – 9/11: Intelligence and National Security Twenty Years Later | The Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsSeptember 23, 2021 — U.S. IC issued accurate strategic warnings on Al Qaeda since 1992, but faced a “paradox of prevention” due to policy inaction acro…House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (.gov)Review of the 9/11 Commission ReportAugust 31, 2026 — strategic operations is legaly barred from taking action to counter domestic … protecting the privacy of American citizens.Reiss Center on Law and SecurityThe Legacy of 9/11: Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism …July 21, 2026 — the FBI’s focus on its reactive, law enforcement function – which resulted in tangible and visible credit to the agency and specif…9/11 advance-knowledge conspiracy theories – WikipediaWarnings from foreign agencies (Iran, Israel, France, Afghanistan) and domestic intelligence (Able Danger, Moussaoui, Bojinka plot…Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US – WikipediaLike all but a handful of PDBs, the memo’s content was kept secret until it was leaked in 2002. CBS Evening News reported on the d…
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

Michael_Novakhov shared this story. AI Mode reply for Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBsThe 2026 declassification of 71 Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has revitalized debate surrounding alternative counterintelligence (CI) analyses of the September 11 attacks. These disclosures reveal that while the Clinton and Bush administrations received persistent, high-level warnings about al-Qaeda’s intent to strike the domestic U.S., the intelligence community failed to produce the rigorous alternative analysis required to understand how the adversary would execute the plot.The Absence of Strategic Alternative AnalysisA primary critique highlighted in official reviews, including the CIA Inspector General’s Report on 9/11, is that the agency completely lacked dedicated, alternative analysis frameworks before the attacks.Operational Overload: Analysts dedicated 30% to 50% of their time to tactical operational support.Long-Range Blind Spots: Intelligence agencies did not conduct comprehensive, long-term strategic assessments of al-Qaeda’s domestic targets.The “Aircraft-as-a-Weapon” Failure: A newly declassified September 1998 PDB explicitly warned that al-Qaeda could fly an explosive-packed aircraft into a U.S. city. Yet, the Counterterrorist Center failed to run alternative scenarios exploring the constraints of such an operation, such as the entry of foreign-trained suicide pilots into the U.S. aviation system.Structural Exploitation and The “Wall”Alternative counterintelligence perspectives emphasize how al-Qaeda successfully exploited structural seams within American intelligence, a vulnerability that standard threat tracking missed.Foreign vs. Domestic Seams: The rigid legal separation between foreign intelligence (CIA) and domestic law enforcement (FBI) prevented all-source synthesis.Counterintelligence Blind Spot: Al-Qaeda operatives weaponized the lack of joint surveillance by planning international operations while physically operating inside domestic U.S. borders undetected by centralized countersurveillance.Collection Gaps: Because counterterrorism was categorized under lower-tier resource priorities prior to the attacks, collection assets were never aligned to map out the adversary’s internal operational security.The Strategic vs. Tactical DichotomyThe newly released PDB papers underscore a fundamental counterintelligence dilemma: the difference between a loud strategic warning and actionable tactical clarity.Analytical MetricPre-9/11 PDB RealityCounterintelligence RequirementStrategic WarningLong and loud; clear indications of a desire to “bring the war home”.Validated; established the adversary’s broad capabilities and goals.Tactical SpecifitySpotty, vague, and highly fragmented threat streams.Deficient; lacked the precise timing, flight numbers, or dates needed to intercept operatives.Executive ActionKept at an advisory level; viewed by some officials as mostly historical context.Disrupted; failed to trigger aggressive, defensive domestic counter-measures.Former intelligence officials contend that the Declassified CIA PDB Documents prove the agency sounded the alarm repeatedly. However, the lack of formalized alternative analysis—specifically “red-teaming” how terrorists would navigate U.S. infrastructure—allowed a transparent strategic threat to slip through tactical gaps.Copied to clipboardFailed to copy to clipboard. Try again later.Council on Foreign RelationsTop Ten Findings of the CIA Inspector General’s Report on 9/11 | Council on Foreign RelationsJune 16, 2015 — Beyond this brief declassified portion of the OIG report, there were many fascinating findings and insights, which are useful to u…Declassified Intelligence Reveals Extensive 9/11September 11, 2026 — CIA reports detailing Osama bin Laden’s plan to attack U.S. cities were included in the president’s daily briefing as early as 199…CIA declassifies dozens of never-before-seen intelligence reports related to 9/11 – CBS NewsSeptember 11, 2026 — The CIA released 71 reports from the months and years leading up to 9/11, providing a new look at what the spy agency told two pre…White House Releases Text of Declassified Intelligence Briefing… fact sheet explaining how the PDB was viewed by the administration before the terrorist attacks on the United States September…Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US – WikipediaLike all but a handful of PDBs, the memo’s content was kept secret until it was leaked in 2002. CBS Evening News reported on the d…The CIA on Friday released its largestSeptember 12, 2026 — The CIA on Friday released its largest-ever batch of declassified presidential intelligence briefs on the threat from Osama bin La…On the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attack, CIA released …Sep 12, 2026 — #Gravitas | On the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attack, CIA released 71 daily presidential briefs from 1998 to 2001 Many o…CIA Releases President’s Daily Briefs in Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of 9/11 – CIASeptember 11, 2026 — Today, Director John Ratcliffe declassified 71 President’s Daily Brief (PDB) products in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of …
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs o

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs o

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadAnalysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com… Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs of skillful strategic deception: – The reliance on unverified sources, – Placement of information by adversaries, – And severe warning fatigue within the administration. These are the signs of skillful strategic deception. The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. Main Article: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Search: skillful strategic deception📷Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google SearchAI ModeAn analysis of the declassified 9/11 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) reveals specific intelligence vulnerabilities that commentators and researchers characterize as indicators of skillful strategic deception. Rather than viewing the tragedy purely as a failure of imagination or information sharing, asymmetric warfare frameworks suggest that the systemic weaknesses in how intelligence was ingested and processed were leveraged effectively against the United States. [1, 2]The discussion around these declassified briefs outlines three core intelligence failures that altogether signal a broader pattern of strategic deception: [1, 2]1. The Reliance on Unverified SourcesDeclassified briefings show that intelligence analysts frequently had to wade through an influx of data originating from questionable channels. A notable brief from July 3, 1998, explicitly highlighted attack plots originating from “highly questionable sources,” yet noted a strike remained “plausible”. [1]The Deception Element: Feeding an intelligence apparatus a mix of legitimate threats and unverified, fabricated information dilutes the credibility of genuine warnings, causing analysts to waste critical investigative resources parsing out noise from actionable signals. [1]2. Strategic Placement of Information by AdversariesA hallmark of strategic deception is the deliberate planting or leak of specific intelligence to manipulate the target’s threat perception. By orchestrating how and when information surfaced, adversaries could obscure their primary objective. [1, 2]The Deception Element: If national security agencies are coaxed into looking toward specific regions, targets, or methods because of placed intelligence, it creates structural blind spots. This allows the actual operational axis (such as domestic flight schools and hijacked commercial airliners) to proceed with minimal disruption. [1]3. Severe “Warning Fatigue” Within the AdministrationIn the months leading up to September 11, the CIA provided “long and loud strategic warnings” regarding the imminent threat posed by Usama bin Laden. However, because these alarms were sustained over a prolonged period without a definitive timeline or precise location, policymakers became desensitized to them. [1]The Deception Element: Sustained, high-amplitude “chatter” can be utilized to induce warning fatigue. When an administration is consistently told that a threat is imminent but nothing immediate occurs, the psychological urgency drops—rendering the system highly vulnerable when the actual operation is executed. [1, 2] Summary of Core FailuresElement of Deception Systemic Vulnerability Impact on 9/11 Preparedness Noise & Fabrication Heavy reliance on unverified sources Diluted the credibility of genuine, high-priority threats. Misdirection Placement of information by adversariesDirected intelligence focus away from domestic operational vectors. Desensitization Chronic warning fatigue Lowered the defensive urgency of administrative policymakers. While institutional retrospective analyses, such as the 9/11 Commission Report, traditionally focus on a “lack of imagination” and poor inter-agency communication, alternative counterintelligence analyses argue that the system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. [1, 2]-AI OverviewThe analysis of declassified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) regarding September 11 centers on systemic intelligence failures, warning fatigue, and the challenges of evaluating threat streams in real time. [1, 2]
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs o

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs o

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadAnalysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com… Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs of skillful strategic deception: – The reliance on unverified sources, – Placement of information by adversaries, – And severe warning fatigue within the administration. These are the signs of skillful strategic deception. The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. Main Article: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Search: skillful strategic deception📷Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google SearchAI ModeAn analysis of the declassified 9/11 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) reveals specific intelligence vulnerabilities that commentators and researchers characterize as indicators of skillful strategic deception. Rather than viewing the tragedy purely as a failure of imagination or information sharing, asymmetric warfare frameworks suggest that the systemic weaknesses in how intelligence was ingested and processed were leveraged effectively against the United States. [1, 2]The discussion around these declassified briefs outlines three core intelligence failures that altogether signal a broader pattern of strategic deception: [1, 2]1. The Reliance on Unverified SourcesDeclassified briefings show that intelligence analysts frequently had to wade through an influx of data originating from questionable channels. A notable brief from July 3, 1998, explicitly highlighted attack plots originating from “highly questionable sources,” yet noted a strike remained “plausible”. [1]The Deception Element: Feeding an intelligence apparatus a mix of legitimate threats and unverified, fabricated information dilutes the credibility of genuine warnings, causing analysts to waste critical investigative resources parsing out noise from actionable signals. [1]2. Strategic Placement of Information by AdversariesA hallmark of strategic deception is the deliberate planting or leak of specific intelligence to manipulate the target’s threat perception. By orchestrating how and when information surfaced, adversaries could obscure their primary objective. [1, 2]The Deception Element: If national security agencies are coaxed into looking toward specific regions, targets, or methods because of placed intelligence, it creates structural blind spots. This allows the actual operational axis (such as domestic flight schools and hijacked commercial airliners) to proceed with minimal disruption. [1]3. Severe “Warning Fatigue” Within the AdministrationIn the months leading up to September 11, the CIA provided “long and loud strategic warnings” regarding the imminent threat posed by Usama bin Laden. However, because these alarms were sustained over a prolonged period without a definitive timeline or precise location, policymakers became desensitized to them. [1]The Deception Element: Sustained, high-amplitude “chatter” can be utilized to induce warning fatigue. When an administration is consistently told that a threat is imminent but nothing immediate occurs, the psychological urgency drops—rendering the system highly vulnerable when the actual operation is executed. [1, 2]Summary of Core FailuresElement of DeceptionSystemic VulnerabilityImpact on 9/11 PreparednessNoise & FabricationHeavy reliance on unverified sourcesDiluted the credibility of genuine, high-priority threats.MisdirectionPlacement of information by adversariesDirected intelligence focus away from domestic operational vectors.DesensitizationChronic warning fatigueLowered the defensive urgency of administrative policymakers.While institutional retrospective analyses, such as the 9/11 Commission Report, traditionally focus on a “lack of imagination” and poor inter-agency communication, alternative counterintelligence analyses argue that the system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. [1, 2]-AI OverviewThe analysis of declassified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) regarding September 11 centers on systemic intelligence failures, warning fatigue, and the challenges of evaluating threat streams in real time. [1, 2]
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs o

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs o

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadAnalysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com… Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs of skillful strategic deception: – The reliance on unverified sources, – Placement of information by adversaries, – And severe warning fatigue within the administration. These are the signs of skillful strategic deception. The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. Main Article: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? https://Search: skillful strategic deception📷Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google SearchAI ModeAn analysis of the declassified 9/11 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) reveals specific intelligence vulnerabilities that commentators and researchers characterize as indicators of skillful strategic deception. Rather than viewing the tragedy purely as a failure of imagination or information sharing, asymmetric warfare frameworks suggest that the systemic weaknesses in how intelligence was ingested and processed were leveraged effectively against the United States. [1, 2]The discussion around these declassified briefs outlines three core intelligence failures that altogether signal a broader pattern of strategic deception: [1, 2]1. The Reliance on Unverified SourcesDeclassified briefings show that intelligence analysts frequently had to wade through an influx of data originating from questionable channels. A notable brief from July 3, 1998, explicitly highlighted attack plots originating from “highly questionable sources,” yet noted a strike remained “plausible”. [1]The Deception Element: Feeding an intelligence apparatus a mix of legitimate threats and unverified, fabricated information dilutes the credibility of genuine warnings, causing analysts to waste critical investigative resources parsing out noise from actionable signals. [1]2. Strategic Placement of Information by AdversariesA hallmark of strategic deception is the deliberate planting or leak of specific intelligence to manipulate the target’s threat perception. By orchestrating how and when information surfaced, adversaries could obscure their primary objective. [1, 2]The Deception Element: If national security agencies are coaxed into looking toward specific regions, targets, or methods because of placed intelligence, it creates structural blind spots. This allows the actual operational axis (such as domestic flight schools and hijacked commercial airliners) to proceed with minimal disruption. [1]3. Severe “Warning Fatigue” Within the AdministrationIn the months leading up to September 11, the CIA provided “long and loud strategic warnings” regarding the imminent threat posed by Usama bin Laden. However, because these alarms were sustained over a prolonged period without a definitive timeline or precise location, policymakers became desensitized to them. [1]The Deception Element: Sustained, high-amplitude “chatter” can be utilized to induce warning fatigue. When an administration is consistently told that a threat is imminent but nothing immediate occurs, the psychological urgency drops—rendering the system highly vulnerable when the actual operation is executed. [1, 2]Summary of Core FailuresElement of DeceptionSystemic VulnerabilityImpact on 9/11 PreparednessNoise & FabricationHeavy reliance on unverified sourcesDiluted the credibility of genuine, high-priority threats.MisdirectionPlacement of information by adversariesDirected intelligence focus away from domestic operational vectors.DesensitizationChronic warning fatigueLowered the defensive urgency of administrative policymakers.While institutional retrospective analyses, such as the 9/11 Commission Report, traditionally focus on a “lack of imagination” and poor inter-agency communication, alternative counterintelligence analyses argue that the system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. [1, 2]-AI OverviewThe analysis of declassified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) regarding September 11 centers on systemic intelligence failures, warning fatigue, and the challenges of evaluating threat streams in real time. [1, 2]
@mikenov: Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception

@mikenov: Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception

Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google Search google.com/search?q=Analysis…

@mikenov: The hypocrisy of the KGB and its officers (Putin) has no limits

The hypocrisy of the KGB and its officers (Putin) has no limits – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+hypo…
@washingtonpost: RT by @mikenov: Decreasing or stopping military aid to Israel is now a position supported by the majority of Americans, according to a poll, and backed by parties from left-wing progressives to mainstream Democratic leaders to the White H

@washingtonpost: RT by @mikenov: Decreasing or stopping military aid to Israel is now a position supported by the majority of Americans, according to a poll, and backed by parties from left-wing progressives to mainstream Democratic leaders to the White H

Decreasing or stopping military aid to Israel is now a position supported by the majority of Americans, according to a poll, and backed by parties from left-wing progressives to mainstream Democratic leaders to the White House. wapo.st/488Tqjf
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue

Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue

Michael_Novakhov shared this story. AI Mode reply for Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigueThe analysis of the declassified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) related to 9/11 highlights how systemic friction points—rather than a total absence of intelligence—converged to obscure the impending attacks. In September 2026, the CIA released over 100 pages of historical PDBs (spanning February 1998 through September 2001). Commentary surrounding these documents focuses on three recurring vulnerabilities:1. Reliance on Unverified and Fragmented SourcesImperfect Information: Many of the early warnings regarding Usama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida relied on sparse, vague, and second- or third-hand reporting.Questionable Provenance: For instance, a PDB from July 3, 1998, explicitly flagged reports from “highly questionable sources” regarding potential plots against U.S. interests, noting the threat was plausible but hard to substantiate.Analytic Dilemma: Analysts were forced to weigh alarming narrative fragments against a baseline of unconfirmed credibility, making it difficult to elevate noisy intelligence into actionable policy directives.2. Strategic Placement and Noise from AdversariesAdversarial Manipulation: Hostile or competing intelligence services, double agents, and opportunistic informants routinely fed fabricated, exaggerated, or misdirected threat streams into Western channels.** cluttering the Pipeline:** Strategic placement of half-truths or skewed threat data buried high-signal intelligence under a mountain of static. This forced counter-terrorism analysts to waste critical cycles distinguishing genuine plots from disinformation or state-sponsored posturing.3. Severe Warning Fatigue Within the Administration”Long and Loud” Alarmism: The declassified record confirms that the CIA issued frequent, escalating warnings over a multi-year period regarding al-Qa’ida’s intent to strike inside the U.S. or against overseas assets.The Boy Who Cried Wolf Effect: Because these warnings were often non-specific (lacking precise dates, times, or target locations) and arrived alongside a constant stream of global threats, senior policy and security decision-makers developed a psychological numbing or “warning fatigue”.Structural Blindness: Rather than a failure to generate any warning at all, the structural collapse was an inability to prioritize a generalized, persistent alarm system when concrete, tactical details remained elusive.For further context on the historical scope of these records, see the official release notes via the CIA Stories Archive.CIA Releases President’s Daily Briefs in Commemoration of …Sep 11, 2026 — This collection represents the Agency’s single largest release of declassified CIA PDB products related to 9/11, providing unprece…Declassified Intelligence Reveals Extensive 9/11 …September 12, 2026 — Quick Summary “The documents released by the CIA today demonstrate what I have always believed, that the CIA provided long and lou…Russia News: Articles and TweetsNov 7, 2026 — Ultimately, these declassified documents don’t alter the fundamental history of the tragedy. Instead, they confirm that the 9/11 f…Michael Novakhov – @mikenov – XNov 8, 2026 — CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception https://t.co/7BK…CIA declassified 71 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) on 9/11. A …October 22, 2026 — #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The discussion revolves around three core intelligence failures: the …Copied to clipboardFailed to copy to clipboard. Try again later.
@mikenov: Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue

@mikenov: Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue

Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue – Google Search google.com/search?q=Analysis…
Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

Michael_Novakhov shared this story. AI Mode reply for Putin and the 9/11 AttacksRussian President Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call U.S. President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, offering immediate solidarity, intelligence sharing, and a brief period of strategic cooperation against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.Immediate Response and ActionsPhone Call & Warning: Putin was the first world leader to reach out to Bush (talking for 40 minutes) and expressed sympathy. Days earlier, on September 9, 2001, Putin had also warned Bush regarding the assassination of anti-Taliban Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, noting that something large might be afoot.Five-Point Support Program: On September 24, 2001, Putin announced a major package of support for the U.S. anti-terror campaign:Shared intelligence, including detailed maps of cave networks in Afghanistan.Opened Russian airspace for U.S. humanitarian flights.Allowed the U.S. military to stage operations out of former Soviet air bases in Central Asian republics.Offered search and rescue support.Provided equipment and military support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.Visit to Ground Zero: In November 2001, Putin visited the World Trade Center site in New York, laying a wreath and meeting with local firefighters, rescuers, and police officers.Common Enemy: Putin viewed Islamic militant groups and terrorism in Afghanistan as an extension of the same threat Russia faced during the Chechen wars.Geopolitical Realignment: He sought to improve U.S.–Russia relations and position Russia as an essential partner to the West.How the Partnership UnraveledThe post-9/11 “honeymoon” in U.S.–Russia relations was short-lived:U.S. Policy Shifts: In 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.The Iraq War: In 2003, Putin strongly opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and refused to join the coalition.NATO Expansion: In 2004, former Soviet bloc nations in Eastern Europe joined NATO, which the Kremlin increasingly resented.End of Cooperation: By his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Putin publicly denounced U.S. foreign policy and international dominance, closing the door on the post-9/11 alignment.Russia’s Tattered 9/11 PromiseSeptember 10, 2026 — Russia’s Tattered 9/11 Promise As CNN later reported, citing a declassified cable from the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency,President Vladimir Putin visited the site of the tragedy of 9/11November 16, 2001 — President Vladimir Putin visited the site of the tragedy of 9/11 Vladimir Putin, November 15, 2001.” Before leaving the site of th…Putin and Bush in Common Cause? Russia’s View of the Terrorist …When Russian President Vladimir Putin picked up the phone to express his sympathy to President Bush in the aftermath of September …After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States …(1) The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks and China-Russia Cooperation Immediately after the attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin expres…9/11 and US-Russia relations – Chatham House9/11 and US-Russia relations – highlights. — How did 9/11 pivot US-Russia relations? For Vladimir Putin, the atrocity of 9/11 mean…What was Putin’s response to 9/11? : r/AskHistorians – RedditApril 11, 2024 — Putin’s 9/11 Response: Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush after the 9/11 attacks, expressing sympath…Facebook·Embassy of Russia in the USA / Посольство России в СШАRussia and US cooperation against terrorism 25 years after 9/11September 10, 2026 — “We entirely and fully share and experience your pain. ” Some Americans, remembering and mourning 9/11, may wish also to remember …September 11 intelligence before the attacksContents * April 2001 Massoud speech Another warning came from Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, i…Copied to clipboardFailed to copy to clipboard. Try again later.
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Audio Post Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception The reliance

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Audio Post Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception The reliance

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadThe Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Audio Post thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deceptionThe reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue within the administration – the signs of skillful strategic deception: The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com… Search: Retrospective Analysis of the 9/11 attacks as the Russian – German – Israeli Special Intelligence Operation Retrospective Approach in Counterintelligence Studies The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – All Feeds Review feeder.co/out/collection/a81…See Also: 9/11 PDBs: Warning Fatigue and Sources share.gemini.google/cV0PaVHA… Search: Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue
@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Audio Post Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception The reliance

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Audio Post Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception The reliance

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad MossadThe Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? Audio Post thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deceptionThe reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue within the administration – the signs of skillful strategic deception: The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com… Search: Retrospective Analysis of the 9/11 attacks as the Russian – German – Israeli Special Intelligence Operation Retrospective Approach in Counterintelligence Studies The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – All Feeds Review thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com… See Also: 9/11 PDBs: Warning Fatigue and Sources share.gemini.google/cV0PaVHA… Search: Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue

@mikenov: 9/11 PDBs: Warning Fatigue and Sources

9/11 PDBs: Warning Fatigue and Sources share.gemini.google/cV0PaVHA…
9/11 and the reinvention of the US intelligence community

9/11 and the reinvention of the US intelligence community

Michael_Novakhov shared this story from Brookings. 7 min read In the aftermath of 9/11 everyone, from elected officials and national security experts to ordinary citizens had one question: how could this happen to a nation with such an enormous and expensive military and intelligence architecture? The question was so ubiquitous that (in spite of some foot dragging by the Bush Administration) it eventually led to the creation of a high-level commission charged with seeking answers. Two and a half years after the attacks, in the summer of 2004, the Commission finished its work and released its report. The overriding conclusion was that the government’s principal failure in 9/11 was a failure to “connect the dots.” [1] What that meant was that pieces of the puzzle were to be found in many corners of the U.S. government but that no one connected the dots well enough or in a timely enough manner to predict with sufficient accuracy the attack that came. “The overriding conclusion was that the government’s principal failure in 9/11 was a failure to ‘connect the dots.’” The report listed in depth the many failures that prevented the government from seeing what was coming. They cut a swath across the vast United States government. The State Department was in charge of visas but failed to catch the fact that several of the visas and passports of the hi-jackers were manipulated in a fraudulent manner. The FBI had the responsibility of keeping track of bad guys inside the United States while the CIA had the responsibility of keeping track of bad guys outside the United States. So two of the terrorists were tracked as they moved internationally (Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar) but tracking responsibility was not handed over to the FBI once they landed in the United States. Even when they were tracked and arrested, as when Zacarias Moussaoui was, he was charged with immigration violations.  However, what brought him to the attention of the FBI—taking flight lessons for the purpose of using an airplane for an attack (he had no interest in learning to land the plane)—was not passed up the chain of command and not linked to the possibility of a broader plot. The Navy had its own intelligence system. And information that linked the attacks on the Navy ship the Cole to one of the 9/11 hi-jackers and to Al-Queda was missed. The FAA was in charge of airline security as well as security at airports. And yet no-fly lists were not updated with the names of terrorists, passengers identified by the airlines’ own system were not checked and aircraft cockpit doors were not hardened. In the lead up to 9/11, the government was collecting vast amounts of data but failing to make sense out of it. Every day the U.S. government was collecting vast amounts of information via its satellites. And yet there were years of conversations waiting to be translated and years of photographs waiting to be looked at. Eight years after 9/11 the problem persisted—including huge backlogs and a shortage of translators. There were other failures as well. The entire intelligence community was built to follow the Soviet monolith and it was moving at a glacial speed to try and adapt to the new threats posed by asymmetric warfare. For instance, it was laden with Russian speakers and disastrously short of Arabic speakers. According to one former intelligence community officer, speaking a few years after the attack, “…to a certain extent, the Soviet Union is still alive and well in the cultures and in the bureaucratic authorities of the IC.” Finally, the 9/11 attacks signaled a change in the very nature of terrorism. Instead of being linked to concrete political goals, the new Islamic version welcomed mass casualties and did not shy away from killing non-combatants. Gina Bennett, a young state department analyst was one of the first American intelligence professionals to describe Osama bin Laden and his world view and she admitted that what she was describing “… wasn’t considered ‘normal’ in the world of counterterrorism.”[2] “In the aftermath of 9/11 pressure built for change and policy makers started creating new organizations.” In the aftermath of 9/11 pressure built for change and policy makers started creating new organizations. In November 2001, Congress created the Transportation Security Agency which federalized airport security which had been largely in the hands of private contractors to the airlines. In late 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act which combined 22 organizations into the first new Cabinet Department since 1989. A combination of factors—the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, criticisms raised during the 2004 presidential campaign and intense pro-reform lobbying by the families of victims of 9/11—resulted in passage of the Intelligence and Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The legislation created a new office, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) which was to “coordinate” the FBI, the CIA and the 14 other agencies that made up the U.S. intelligence community. And it established the National Counterterrorism Center to analyze and integrate all intelligence and threats to Americans at home and abroad. The law was an attempt to make the boundaries between domestic and international intelligence that had contributed to the nation’s inability to disrupt the 9/11 attacks more porous.  But it also raised concerns about privacy and civil liberties. Thus, the law also created the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The early organizational changes struck many as orthogonal to the real problems—like moving the deck chairs on the Titanic. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in particular, had severe growing pains—becoming at times a dumping ground for political appointees. But the organizational changes suffused the government with the ethos of sharing information that could lead to attacks. National Defense became a truly national function, shared by the cop on the beat as well as by the spy in the souk. DHS and the FBI created information sharing organizations in cities and states. For much of this time and until his death in 2011, bin Laden dreamed of repeating his 9/11 attacks with another mass casualty attack on the West—as recounted by Peter Bergen in his new book, The Rise and Fall of Osama bin Laden. Attacks were foiled and home-grown terrorists caught and jailed. Even though the ODNI and DHS and the proliferation of counter terrorism centers sounded like a lot of bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo—the front lines of American security were transformed. More intelligence was shared and training was altered.  The border patrol agent, the state department visa specialist, the flight attendant, and the general public (“See something, Say something”) were all on the lookout for trouble. Intelligence failures still happen, despite protestations to the contrary. It looks like the failure to predict the rapid fall of Kabul, Afghanistan is just the latest. But the U.S. homeland is no longer dependent on one intelligence body. The multi-layered system of government has served us well over the past twenty years, let’s hope it continues. [1] The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York, Norton, 2004, p. 408. [2] Bergen, Peter, The Rise and Fall of Osama bin Laden, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2021, p. 103. The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact. We are supported by a diverse array of funders. In line with our values and policies, each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).

@mikenov: What would be the process of 9/11 reinvesigation, if the new data: evidence or analysis emerge?

What would be the process of 9/11 reinvesigation, if the new data: evidence or analysis emerge? – Google Search google.com/search?q=What+wou…
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9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED

 

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9/11 Revisited: Was it the Putin – Sharon – Schroeder’s Very Special Political Intelligence Operation?

Audio Post 

Synopsis 

1. Overview 

9/11 Revisited: 

Was it the Putin – Sharon – Schroeder’s Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? 

Putin The Mastermind: He communicates in accidents.  The 9/11 Attacks: The Special Tripartite Operation  Hypothesis – Google AI Review 

Was the Counterintelligence Investigation of 9/11 Attacks RESOLVED? 

The Significance of TRUTH in the 9/11 investigations

Investigations and Misinvestigations of 9/11 Attacks 

9/11 Truth movement and the alternative theories 



    1.1 The Declassified 9/11 PDBs

The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: what transpired? 

The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The induced “warning fatigue”

The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: Questionable sources, skillful placements 

Induced “Warning Fatigue”: The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: questionable sources, skillful placements, warning fatigue – AI Mode

Analyzing 9/11 PDBs: Persistent but useless warnings about the Al Qaeda in intelligence reports, including from Russia, Germany, and Israel as the cover: questionable sources, skillful placements – GS

9/11 PDBs: Warning Fatigue and Sources – Gemini 

2. The Hypothesis: 

Russia, Germany, and Israel were behind the 9/11 Attacks 

    The Role of Russia in the background of the 9/11 Attacks 

        Putin: CIA Profile 

    The Role of Germany in the background of the 9/11 Attacks 

        Gerhard Schroeder: CIA Profile 

        August Hanning 

            August Hanning and his role in the investigations of the                9/11 Attacks

    The Role of Israel in the background of the 9/11 Attacks 

        Ariel Sharon: CIA Profile 

The 9/11 Hijackers were well trained in Operational Security 

The 9/11 Hijackers and their possible State connections and sponsorship 


3. Conclusions of the present, not mutually exclusive theories of 9/11 and the calls for Reinvestigation 


Links 

9/11 Revisited: Was it the Putin – Sharon – Schroeder’s Very Special Political Intelligence Operation?

Was the Counterintelligence Investigation of 9/11 Attacks RESOLVED? – AI Mode 


______________________________________


9/11 Revisited:  Was it the Putin – Sharon – Schroeder’s Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? 


Search: 

Retrospective Analysis of the 9/11 attacks as the Russian – German – Israeli Special Intelligence Operation 

Retrospective Approach in Counterintelligence Studies 


The 9/11 Attacks Revisited, 25 years later. 
Was it the Russian – German – Israeli “Special Operation”, with Putin as the Mastermind, at the head of this Anti-American Intelligence Alliance? Reading Putin’s mind: he communicates in accidents … – Google AI Review. 
We do need to reopen the 9/11 investigations, at least in the realm of the public discussions. The Al Qaeda version alone does not convince anyone. We need to dig deeper. 
The 9/11 Attacks were the terror act and the crime of the century. But it does not have to be the Big Lie and the mystery of the century. 

  

 

 

The “Tripartite Hypothesis” regarding Vladimir Putin and the 9/11 attacks is an unverified, alternative counterintelligence theory and conspiracy narrative popularized on niche open-source intelligence blogs—specifically curated by blogger Michael Novakhov on platforms like [Global Security And Intelligence News Review](globalsecuritynews.org “The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – The “Tripartite Hypothesis” – Google AI Review”). [1]

The narrative utilizes AI-generated text analyses (such as Gemini prompts) to stitch together historical intelligence gaps, geopolitical timelines, and the arrest of foreign officials to argue that Al-Qaeda was merely a front for a sophisticated, state-sponsored operation masterminded by Vladimir Putin in alliance with elements of German and Israeli intelligence. 

Distorting the Context of “Google AI Reviews”
The title’s reference to a “Google AI Review” stems from the blog author’s method of using large language models to evaluate counterintelligence concepts. When prompted with hypothetical scenarios—such as the plausibility of “backstopping” (creating a false trail of intelligence warnings to build a cover story)—the AI outlines how such espionage tactics work theoretically. The blog then aggregates these structural definitions to give the appearance of an algorithmic “validation” of the conspiracy theory itself. 

AI Overview

Large language models (LLMs) and generative artificial intelligence are increasingly integrated into intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) operations to process vast data streams, assist human analysts, and evaluate tradecraft standards.

The September 11 terrorist attacks have been the subject of the most extensive investigations in modern U.S. history. Official government inquiries, independent commissions, and academic studies have definitively established the sequence of events and identified the perpetrators.
The primary responsibility for the planning and execution of the attacks rests with the terrorist network al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden and operational mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 
The phrase “he communicates in accidents” highlights a defining feature of Vladimir Putin’s political strategy: leveraging deniable, chaotic, or seemingly accidental events to signal power, enforce internal discipline, and keep external adversaries off balance.
Whether examining his psychological profile, his inner circle dynamics, or geopolitical standoffs, analyzing Putin’s “mind” requires looking past standard diplomatic rhetoric. Instead, observers must decode the calculated patterns behind events officially dismissed as mere mishaps or coincidences. 

The phrase “he communicates in accidents” highlights a defining feature of Vladimir Putin’s political strategy: leveraging deniable, chaotic, or seemingly accidental events to signal power, enforce internal discipline, and keep external adversaries off balance.
Whether examining his psychological profile, his inner circle dynamics, or geopolitical standoffs, analyzing Putin’s “mind” requires looking past standard diplomatic rhetoric. Instead, observers must decode the calculated patterns behind events officially dismissed as mere mishaps or coincidences. [1, 2, 3, 4]

1. The Strategy of “Strategic Ambiguity”
Putin’s background in the KGB heavily influences his communication style. In traditional diplomacy, leaders use speeches, press releases, and treaties to signal intent. Putin frequently communicates through manufactured ambiguity.
  • Calculated Chaos: When opposition figures fall ill, infrastructure suffers sudden failures, or military maneuvers push boundaries, the Kremlin routinely claims these are “accidents” or internal matters.
  • The Message: The underlying message to the world is highly deliberate: We can disrupt your security or stability at any moment, and we will maintain total deniability while doing so.
2. Internal Discipline: The “Accident” as a Warning
Domestically, communicating in accidents is an effective tool for maintaining autocratic control over the Russian elite. [1]
  • Enforcing Loyalty: When high-ranking oligarchs, military officials, or dissidents experience sudden, fatal falls from windows, unexplained poisonings, or unexpected plane crashes, it sends a clear message to the remaining elite.
  • The Psychological Effect: The lack of an official admission of guilt creates an atmosphere of pervasive paranoia. It signals that no one is untouchable, forcing absolute loyalty to the state without the Kremlin needing to trigger formal, politically disruptive executions. [1, 2]
3. Geopolitical Brinkmanship: Testing Red Lines
On the international stage, this communication style manifests as geopolitical testing.
  • Plausible Deniability: Cyberattacks on Western infrastructure, GPS jamming over the Baltic region, and close-quarters military intercepts are often shrugged off by Russian officials as technical glitches or rogue operations.
  • Pushing Boundaries: By framing these escalations as accidental, Putin tests the boundaries of NATO and Western resolve. It forces Western leaders into a difficult position: either accept the “accident” explanation to avoid direct conflict, or risk escalating a war over an event Russia claims it did not intend. [1]
4. The Risk of Miscalculation
While communicating through accidents keeps adversaries guessing, analysts warn that this strategy carries severe dangers:
  • The Paranoia Trap: Isolating himself within a tight, highly filtered echo chamber increases the risk that Putin may misjudge how the West responds to these “accidents.”
  • Escalation Management: When brinkmanship relies heavily on chaotic, deniable events—such as kinetic operations near nuclear facilities or critical energy sectors—the line between a controlled “accidental” signal and a catastrophic, real-world crisis becomes dangerously thin. [1, 2, 3]
Summary: The Core Takeaway
To understand Putin’s decision-making, observers must realize that the accident is often the message itself. By utilizing events that occupy the gray zone between deliberate aggression and random misfortune, the Kremlin successfully projects power, commands fear, and avoids direct accountability. [1, 2] 


INTERPRETATION

thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com/2026/10/the-mi
Putin: It is an Art, a Game, the Striker Sport for me. A football. They got a goal, you got a goal. It is a fight, a struggle. The smartest and the boldest win.


And I would add: It is also A DEEP RAGE, WELL CONTROLLED, CALCULATED, AND WEAPONIZED.

–

The Synopsis
The Contents: Thoughts and Links


The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – The “Tripartite Hypothesis” – Google AI Review 

The Significance 

The scholarly and historical consensus states that thoroughly investigating the September 11 attacks is critical because 9/11 served as the foundational catalyst for 21st-century global geopolitics, national security frameworks, and civil liberties. Over two decades of extensive analysis by government bodies, independent researchers, and historians underscore that a precise understanding of the event’s planning, execution, and state-sponsored or institutional enablers is vital for preserving democratic accountability, international stability, and historical truth.
The multifaceted significance of establishing an exhaustive and accurate record of the attacks spans several critical domains.
🏛️ Political Significance & Democratic Accountability
The political ramifications of 9/11 reshape governance and the relationship between citizens and the state.
  • Foreign Policy Sanity: The official findings of the 9/11 Commission directly shaped the “Global War on Terror,” leading to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Ensuring complete accuracy regarding state complicity or funding is essential to prevent misdirected military actions and long-term foreign policy blunders.
  • Oversight of Intelligence Apparatchiks: Deep investigations expose systemic vulnerabilities and the failure of intelligence sharing among agencies like the CIA and FBI. Identifying these breakdowns holds institutions accountable and forces necessary, transparent reforms rather than unchecked expansion of bureaucratic power.
  • Combating Government Secrecy: Continuous public pressure to declassify related documents—such as the declassification of files regarding potential foreign government links—strengthens the principle of democratic transparency, ensuring that diplomatic or economic alliances do not shield culpable entities.
🛡️ Social Significance & Domestic Fabric
Sociologically, the precision of 9/11 investigations directly impacts public trust, civil rights, and social cohesion.
  • Restoring Institutional Trust: When gaps or inconsistencies persist in high-profile investigations, public faith in democratic institutions erodes. Clear, verified truths are the primary antidote to institutional cynicism and pervasive misinformation.
  • Civil Liberties Protection: The attacks prompted sweeping domestic legislation, most notably the USA PATRIOT Act, which fundamentally altered privacy laws and expanded state surveillance. Thorough retrospective analysis determines whether these sacrifices of civil liberties were genuinely justified by facts or driven by reactionary panic.
  • Mitigating Xenophobia and Islamophobia: Pinpointing the precise individuals, radical networks, and specific state factions responsible prevents the broad, dangerous scapegoating of entire religious, ethnic, or national groups, protecting vulnerable communities from collective blame.
📜 Historical Significance & Systemic Lessons
From a historical perspective, establishing a definitive, factual baseline prevents the distortion of collective memory.
  • Preventing Historical Revisionism: A rigorously documented, evidence-based record ensures that future generations understand the event based on empirical facts rather than political spin, state propaganda, or unverified fringe theories.
  • Evolving Counter-Terrorism Doctrines: Accurate identification of how the logistics, illicit financing, and radicalization networks functioned allows global security experts to develop precise counter-terrorism frameworks that target actual systemic threats rather than superficial symptoms.
  • Justice for Victims and Survivors: For the families of the victims and the survivors, identifying every tier of culprit—from the hijackers to the financiers—is a fundamental prerequisite for legal justice, financial restitution, and psychological closure.


Part 1: 9/11 Investigations and Misinvestigations 

Part 1: The Mastermind and the Investigation – Feed

The official narrative of the 9/11 attacks overlooks foreign state sponsorship, the non-state actors like Al-Qaeda were merely “foot soldiers” rather than the true architects. The true “Mastermind” was Putin. It was his operation, one of the series of many, with the common contextual, conceptual, and operational patterns, bearing the traces of his complex political personality, including the traits of the Recruiter and the Uniter.
AI Mode 
Historical records show that while the George W. Bush administration initially opposed creating an independent commission, official oversight investigations attribute 9/11 failures to systemic intelligence sharing breakdowns rather than a coordinated suppression of the truth.
Critics, including some lawmakers involved in the early congressional inquiries, have argued that the Bush Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under Robert Mueller resisted transparency, pointing to delayed clearances and redacted documents. 

Summary

The institutional friction between investigators and the executive branch is well-documented. 
Rather than a coordinated conspiracy to hide the “true” architects of the attacks, the actions taken by the Bush administration and Mueller’s FBI are widely understood by historians and investigators as efforts to protect classified intelligence-gathering methods, avoid public institutional embarrassment, 
(!) and preserve sensitive foreign diplomatic alliances. 
My question: Including Russia, Israel, and Germany? 

Analyzing 9/11 PDBs
Persistent but useless warnings about the Al Qaeda in intelligence reports, including from Russia, Germany, and Israel as the cover: questionable sources, skillful placements – GS:
U.S. intelligence files declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confirm that the United States received a high volume of vague, non-specific threat alerts from multiple global entities prior to September 11, 2001. These documents—including President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) spanning from 1998 through September 2001—show that while foreign services like those of Russia, Germany, and Israel frequently flagged Al Qaeda intentions, the raw intelligence often suffered from “warning fatigue,” questionable sources, and a lack of specific, actionable data. [1, 2, 3]
The systemic breakdown described as “questionable sources and skillful placements” manifests across the intelligence chain in several distinct ways.




On September 11, 2026—the 25th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks—the CIA declassified 71 President’s Daily Brief (PDB) products related to al-Qa’ida and Osama bin Laden.

Analyzing 9/11 PDBs and Deception Hypotheses – Gemini 



The intelligence documents reveal that by late 1999, the frequency of conflicting threat targets was so high that senior officials—including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—questioned whether Al-Qaeda was intentionally feeding the U.S. false information to force them into wasting resources.

My opinion:

AI Overview

U.S. intelligence files declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confirm that the United States received a high volume of vague, non-specific threat alerts from multiple global entities prior to September 11, 2001. These documents—including President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) spanning from 1998 through September 2001—show that while foreign services like those of Russia, Germany, and Israel frequently flagged Al Qaeda intentions, the raw intelligence often suffered from “warning fatigue,” questionable sources, and a lack of specific, actionable data. [1, 2, 3]
The systemic breakdown described as “questionable sources and skillful placements” manifests across the intelligence chain in several distinct ways:




PERSISTENT WARNINGS AS THE COVER

“Fourty warnings in three years” is on average one warning monthly. Nice job of Cover building.
The info was coming from Russia, Germany, and Israel. among the others. Is it not interesting?

“Title and Intent: Titled “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US,” the brief was compiled by the CIA at the request of President Bush, who had specifically asked if any intelligence pointed to a domestic threat.”
– Who helped him to formulate this question? The one who knew the answer?

Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs), intelligence warnings
Analyzing 9/11 PDBs and Deception Hypotheses – GS

AI Mode
The relationship between Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs), intelligence warnings, and the subsequent “deception hypotheses” surrounding the September 11 attacks centers on what the U.S. government knew prior to 9/11 and how agencies responded afterward.
For decades, the historical debate was shaped by a high-volume “signal-to-noise” problem. However, newly declassified materials have provided more granular insights into how information flowed to the highest levels of government. [1, 2]







While no verified evidence links these intelligence services to the orchestration of the attacks, various historical intelligence points and persistent geopolitical conspiracy theories involve these three nations.

“Evaluating the “Tripartite Hypothesis” (Russia, Germany, Israel) – Gemini
Nikolai Patrushev, August Hanning, Efraim Halevy, and the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search
In alternative counterintelligence literature and fringe OSINT analysis, Patrushev, Hanning, and Halevy are sometimes grouped together as the alleged nexus of a covert state-sponsored operation behind 9/11.” – Gemini.
Intelligence Chiefs and 9/11 Analysis
share.gemini.google/53XOpjhmd1sk
Nikolai Patrushev, August Hanning, and Efraim Halevy sat at the helm of their respective nations’ primary intelligence services on September 11, 2001—leading Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and Israel’s Mossad.

Call the 911!


#Israel: “Do not train the Saudi pilots, they will turn against you!”
#Russia: ” Do not send your Saudi pilots to Chechnya, they will turn against you!”
#Germany: “Send these moronic pilots anywhere, we don’t care; but not against us, we had enough!”

The role of the numbers of the well trained pilots in the military competition between Israel and Saudi Arabia: How 9/11 affected this balance? – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+r
The official narrative of the 9/11 attacks overlooks foreign state sponsorship, the non-state actors like Al-Qaeda were merely “foot soldiers” rather than the true architects. The true “Mastermind” was Putin. It was his operation, one of the series of many, with the common contextual, conceptual, and operational patterns, bearing the traces of his complex political personality, including the traits of the Recruiter and the Uniter.


While mainstream intelligence agencies and the 9/11 Commission report attribute the attacks strictly to Al-Qaeda operating out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the testimonies of Litvinenko and Borovoy remain the foundation for theories that the Kremlin conducted a dangerous “double game” with the hijackers’ leadership.

Search:


Russia historically weaponized and infiltrated international terrorist organizations to serve its geopolitical interests—specifically utilizing them as leverage against Western powers.



WHO BENEFITED? RUSSIA, GERMANY, ISRAEL.

THE EFFECTS: WHAT HAPPPENED AFTER 9/11?

The After Effects of 9/11 in suspected players and US:
THE RIGHTIST REALIGNMENT:
9/11 caused a global shift to the Right, in tune with Putin’s “conservatism”.
Mission accomplished!
Search:
How did Israel benefit geopolitically from 9/11?
How did Schroeder’s Germany change politically and geopolitically after 9/11?
How did Putin’s Russia change politically and geopolitically after 9/11?
Political shift to the Right in US after 9/11
RIGHTIST REALIGNMENT after 9/11
Putin’s conservatism



The nature of the investigative hypotheses in the counterintelligence investigations of 9/11 attack

    
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The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – All Feeds Review



Part 1: The Mastermind and the Investigation


Встреча с председателем «Деловой России» Алексеем Репиком • Президент России


The official narrative of the 9/11 attacks overlooks foreign state sponsorship, the non-state actors like Al-Qaeda were merely “foot soldiers” rather than the true architects. The true “Mastermind” was Putin. It was his operation, one of the series of many, with the common contextual, conceptual, and operational patterns, bearing the traces of his complex political personality, including the traits of the Recruiter and the Uniter.

At the center of this hypothesis is the political personality of V. Putin, the true Mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. 9/11 is the counterintelligence error, with failure to monitor the foreign leaders closely and to try to understand better their motivations and actions, both overt and the covert.

When the advantages gained by Russia, Germany, and Israel are so obvious and dramatic, just like the general shift to the Right; it is more than just a lucky and random fruit falling in their laps. There must be a causal connection there, especially from the counterintelligence perspectives.
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Instead of the Foreword:




#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad

The two co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, believe that the government established the 9/11 Commission in a way that ensured that it would fail.
…
“So there were all kinds of reasons we thought we were set up to fail”, Hamilton argues.

Criticism of the 9/11 Commission – Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism

SEARCH: Criticism of the 9/11 Commission:

The 9/11 Commission has faced significant criticism from political figures, intelligence officials, civil liberties advocates, and families of the victims.


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My opinion: 
By “true culprits” I mean the masterminds and the behind the scenes organizers, not just the foot soldiers – the hijackers. 
It is impossible to take the “Al Qaeda” version seriously, and something more than just the elaborate, meticulously prepared in advance COVER.

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Lack of Analytical Focus: The Bureau operated primarily as a reactive law enforcement agency built to solve crimes after they occurred, rather than an intelligence agency designed to preemptively disrupt complex global terrorist plots.




#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad
Google AI: “The FBI actively restricted, delayed, or classified critical pieces of evidence in investigation of 9/11.”

(My Opinion: Under the orders from ABOVE, pushing their lame “Al Qaeda” version.)

The claim that the Bush Administration and Robert Mueller’s FBI suppressed the 9/11 investigation is a subject of significant historical debate, involving documented political friction, institutional resistance, and subsequent declassifications rather than a blanket suppression. While official investigations did take place, multiple independent sources and former officials have detailed specific instances where the administration and the FBI actively restricted, delayed, or classified critical pieces of evidence.

The true, in depth 9/11 investigation was suppressed by the Bush Administration and Robert Mueller’s FBI

– Google Search

And more than that: The views that disagreed and challenged the “Al Qaeda” version of 9/11 were actively and systematically suppressed by the U.S. Government and its extensions, which reminds the Soviet style of global censorship, and possibly a sign of Putin’s political personality.



AI Mode 
Historical records show that while the George W. Bush administration initially opposed creating an independent commission, official oversight investigations attribute 9/11 failures to systemic intelligence sharing breakdowns rather than a coordinated suppression of the truth.
Critics, including some lawmakers involved in the early congressional inquiries, have argued that the Bush Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under Robert Mueller resisted transparency, pointing to delayed clearances and redacted documents. Conversely, government reviews, such as the 9/11 Commission Report and subsequent Department of Justice Inspector General reports, concluded that the primary issue was institutional inertia and poor coordination between agencies, not a cover-up. [1, 2, 3, 4]

Summary

The institutional friction between investigators and the executive branch is well-documented. 
Rather than a coordinated conspiracy to hide the “true” architects of the attacks, the actions taken by the Bush administration and Mueller’s FBI are widely understood by historians and investigators as efforts to protect classified intelligence-gathering methods, avoid public institutional embarrassment, and preserve sensitive foreign diplomatic alliances. 
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My opinion – Search: 







My impression: It looks like the paper and/or cyber trail were carefully and skillfully constructed as the part of the Cover in preparation for the 9/11 attacks. This is not the style of the non-state actors, such as “Al Qaeda”.

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9/11 truth movement – W


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Supporters of the 9/11 Truth movement at an anti-war demonstration in Los Angeles, October 2007

The 9/11 truth movement encompasses a disparate group of adherents to a set of overlapping conspiracy theories that dispute the general consensus of the September 11 attacks that a group of Al-Qaeda terrorists had hijacked four airliners and crashed them into the Pentagon and the original World Trade Center Twin Towers, which consequently collapsed. The primary focus is what the movement perceives as missed information that they allege is not adequately explained in the official National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reports, such as the collapse of 7 World Trade Center. They believe in a cover-up and, at the least, complicity by insiders.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]

They analyze evidence from the attacks, come up with different conspiracy theories about how the attacks happened and call for a new investigation into the attacks

Alternative theories regarding the September 11 attacks—commonly referred to as 9/11 conspiracy theories—contend that the official account of the attacks is either incomplete or intentionally fabricated. While structural engineers, aviation experts, and the official 9/11 Commission Report conclude that the destruction was caused by four hijacked commercial aircraft operated by al-Qaeda terrorists, various alternative narratives have persisted since 2001. [1, 2, 3]
These alternative theories generally fall into two main categories of government complicity or look toward completely separate actors:



While no verified evidence links these intelligence services to the orchestration of the attacks, various historical intelligence points and persistent geopolitical conspiracy theories involve these three nations.

THE MISSING LINK: GERMANY’S STATE SUPPORT FOR THE HAMBURG CELL

Search:

GERMANY’S STATE SUPPORT FOR THE HAMBURG CELL

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossadd Mossad


The phrase “9/11: the missing link” refers to a prominent public theory and a series of high-profile statements made by August Hanning – News Review
thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com/2026/10/the-ph
My impression:
Hanning was on the right track with his “frequent” remarks about the role of the “STATE SUPPORT” for Hamburg cell, although it is unclear if he considered Germany itself in this role. It was a powerful opinion, at odds with the official version of the non-state Al Qaeda, and someone (the true culprits) probably did not like it, because it could lead directly to them. What followed, looks like a SETUP, the series of traps for Hanning, from his financial ruin (prearranged?) to his various unrelated private investigations which eventually lead to his arrest and current predicament. Now he is effectively shut off from the world and can talk only to his native BND. His former boss Gerhard Schroeder looks unconcerned about this, and, to the contrary, rather happy in his meeting with Putin: was this his birthday present?
It looks like the “STATE SUPPORT” for the Hamburg Cell, of which Hanning frequently spoke out, went directly from Gerhard Schroeder through his own channels, via the local Hamburg politicians, bypassing Hanning; otherwise Hanning would not speak about it so readily, risking to implicate himself and Germany.
The aim of this support was to help the future hijackers in their adaptation to the life in the western society, so they could fit seamlessly, i
nconspicuously, and unsuspiciously into the life in the US, while attending the pilots schools. At the same time, they were continuously “egged on” and WEAPONIZED.

–


9/11: the missing link – August Hanning – Google AI Mode: The phrase “9/11: the missing link” refers to a prominent public theory and a series of high-profile statements made by August Hanning, the former head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), regarding the 2001 terrorist attacks. [1, 2] Hanning, who led the BND from 1998 to 2005, has frequently spoken out about a missing link in the official 9/11 investigations—specifically targeting the logistical and financial state support given to the Hamburg Al-Qaeda cell, which included lead hijacker Mohamed Atta.

Hanning has argued that the hijackers could not have lived and operated so seamlessly in Germany without structured, domestic assistance that went largely unmapped by the initial U.S. and German investigations. [1, 2]


9/11: the missing link – August Hanning – Google Search google.com/search?q=9%2F1


The Historical Investigation (August Hanning vs. The 9/11 Hamburg Cell)

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Hanning—acting as the BND chief—headed the German intelligence apparatus tasked with mapping how al-Qaeda pilots like Mohamed Atta operated undetected from Germany. [1, 2]
Operational Failures: The investigation revealed severe intelligence oversight. German authorities admitted they actually had members of the cell and their Marienstrasse apartment under surveillance in 1998 and 1999 due to a suspected bin Laden operative. However, the surveillance was abandoned when investigators failed to connect the students to an active threat. [1]
The Chechnya Pivot: Intelligence records compiled during the post-9/11 investigations showed that the Hamburg cell members initially intended to fight in Chechnya. A chance encounter on a German train with an extremist named Khalid Masri redirected them to a Mauritanian businessman, who subsequently introduced them to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, where they were recruited for the plane operation. [1]
Logistical Support: The intelligence findings mapped out how the cell utilized individuals like Said Bahaji and Mounir El Motassadeq to manage routine banking and university affairs while the primary pilots were away training in Afghanistan and the United States, allowing them to avoid drawing the suspicion of immigration officials. [1, 2]
The intersection of these two timelines created a massive political scandal in Germany, shifting August Hanning’s legacy from the man who investigated the 9/11 Hamburg terrorists to a suspect arrested because of a Hamburg police raid on his own home. [1, 2]

The results of Hanning’s investigation of the Hamburg cell: summary – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+r


Germany’s former foreign intelligence chief August Hanning and 9/11


August Hanning served as the President of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, from 1998 to 2005. This placed him at the helm of German intelligence during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

(Note: In a major breaking development as of October 6, 2026, Hanning was arrested in Germany on suspicion of espionage and treason. He is accused of purchasing classified intelligence documents from a former BND employee, identified as Manfred D., in order to resell them.)

Hanning’s tenure and his agency’s connection to 9/11 and its aftermath are defined by three major intelligence events:

The Hamburg Cell Oversight


AI Overview

August Hanning served as the President of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) from 1998 to 2005, a crucial tenure that directly overlapped with the September 11 attacks and the subsequent international counterterrorism investigations. [1, 2, 3]
Because the central operational cell behind the attacks—including lead hijacker Mohamed Atta—lived, studied, and planned the logistics of the plot in Hamburg, Germany, Hanning and the BND occupied a pivotal role in the post-9/11 investigations. [1, 2]
His role and historical legacy regarding the 9/11 investigations are defined by three major areas:

1. Overseeing the Investigation into the Hamburg Cell

Immediately following the attacks, Hanning directed the BND’s internal investigations into the Al-Qaeda infrastructure within Germany. The BND worked extensively to uncover how the “Hamburg Cell” had operated undetected on German soil, mapping out their logistical networks, banking records, and foreign communications. Under his leadership, the BND heavily restructured to pivot away from traditional Cold War espionage and lean toward aggressive anti-terror strategy and intelligence-sharing with allies like the CIA and MI6. [1, 2, 3, 4]

2. Proposing the 9/11 “Missing Link” Theory

In the years following his intelligence career, Hanning became a prominent voice commenting on the blind spots of the initial 9/11 investigations. He famously raised public theories regarding what he termed the “missing link” of 9/11. 
Hanning argued that the official U.S. and international investigations left a critical gap: how Mohamed Atta and his co-conspirators managed to seamlessly live, study, and finance their operations in Germany for years without some level of structured domestic or external state-backed logistical support. He contended that the full extent of this potential support network was never fully mapped out by investigators. [1, 2]




Nikolai Patrushev, August Hanning, Efraim Halevy, and the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search
Nikolai Patrushev, August Hanning, and Efraim Halevy sat at the helm of their respective nations’ primary intelligence services on September 11, 2001—leading Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and Israel’s Mossad.

Examining these three figures together requires separating two distinct frameworks: the documented historical record of pre-9/11 intelligence warnings, jurisdictional blind spots, and post-9/11 geopolitical realignment; and the alternative counterintelligence hypothesis that attempts to link Moscow, Berlin, and Tel Aviv as covert facilitators of the attacks.

1. The Counterparts in September 2001



August Hanning and Gerhard Schroeder – Google Search

Call the 911!

#Israel: “Do not train the Saudi pilots, they will turn against you!”
#Russia: ” Do not send your Saudi pilots to Chechnya, they will turn against you!”
#Germany: “Send these moronic pilots anywhere, we don’t care; but not against us, we had enough!”

The military balance between the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) has historically favored Israel due to human capital rather than airframe counts, and the post-9/11 era shifted political dynamics that preserved Israel’s qualitative pilot and doctrinal edge while redirecting Saudi strategic priorities away from direct competition.



The September 11 attacks shifted this dynamic by significantly modifying how both nations trained their pilots, and altering the structural military relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The number and exceptional preparation of combat pilots have historically formed the cornerstone of Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), a U.S.-mandated policy ensuring Israel maintains a regional technological and operational advantage. While Saudi Arabia historically possessed superior numbers of advanced airframes, it faced systemic challenges in building a massive, natively trained elite pilot corps, relying heavily on U.S.-led training pipelines. [1, 2, 3, 4]
…

The Shift from Rivals to Shared Security Concerns

Paradoxically, the post-9/11 era altered the competitive nature of Israel-Saudi relations. As the U.S. focus shifted toward global counter-terrorism and countering Iran, the perceived threat of a conventional air war between Israel and Saudi Arabia diminished. [9]
The two nations transitioned into a framework of tacit intelligence sharing and airspace coordination. This transformation became evident during civil aviation emergencies, such as the foiled flydubai hijacking attempt where both Israeli and Saudi air defense forces actively scrambled jets in a synchronized response to a mutual 9/11-style threat. [9, 10, 11] 

If Russia, Israel, and Germany are behind 9/11, here are their hypothetical motivations.
Russia intended to stop further unravelling of the USSR by turning the tables on the Western sponsors of Chechen separatists, including the US, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim countries, by forming the anti-American Al Qaeda as the cover.
Israel intended to ignite the intense hostilities between the Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries, and the US, in the hope of benefitting from it, and strengthening the alliance with the US.
Germany, namely Schroeder, found the way to express their post-WW2 hatred for the US and to affirm their short lived, post-German unification gratitude and closeness with Russia.
These were the large scale, strategic, long term motivations and plans, with 9/11 as the “proper” action and the Special Operation.
The technical acumen of the Operation 9/11 points to the state sponsored operation, not the half-literate “Al Qaeda”.

All this is pretty much on the surface, and it does not require the deep digging.
What does, is the ease and readiness to be deceived on the part of the CIA, FBI, and other investigators.
The famous American group think and conformity may be the answers to this question.
And of course our universal, human, all too human ability for Denial and Self-deception.
It protects us from the Unbearable Pain of Knowledge.

  • Intelligence Profiles: Declassified CIA psychological profiles from that era characterized Sharon as a “brilliant, ruthless, and ambitious” military and political strategist. [1]
  • Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: During his time as Prime Minister, the CIA worked intimately with Israeli intelligence to manage counterterrorism operations in the West Bank and Gaza, despite the public political clashes between Sharon and the Bush administration regarding settlement expansion and his fiery rhetoric. [1, 2, 3, 4]


Ariel Sharon’s fierce independence
and his aggressive, no holds barred attitude in defending the Israel’s interests, as he saw them; and his political personality and his past history (see the Iran-Contra affair below), make his clandestine (and very effective) role and participation in the 9/11 Attacks, in cahoots with Putin, not only quite possible but very likely.
His illness, probably induced by the CIA, confirms this hypothesis.
It is also quite possible that Putin “sold him out” to the CIA prior to that: blamed everything on him, as the Russian common criminal habit is, to save his own skin.
The future declassifications may shine some dimmed light on this thesis.

Ariel Sharon and Iran-Contra affair – Google Search


Ariel Sharon played a direct, foundational role in early Israel-Iran arms channels and regional maneuvers that later intertwined with the origins of the Iran–Contra affair. [1, 2]

Role as Defense Minister (1981–1983)

Arms Sales to Iran: As Israel’s Defense Minister, Sharon publicly and privately defended and oversaw Israeli arms sales and spare parts shipments to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War, operating on the strategic premise that Iraq was Israel’s primary threat. [1, 2]
U.S. Authorization Conflicts: In 1981, an arrangement was made with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig allowing case-by-case reviews of U.S.-origin equipment transfers to Iran. However, the U.S. rescinded the agreement in 1982 after concluding that Sharon was shipping American-made military hardware to Iran without proper U.S. clearance. [1]
1982 Anti-Khomeini Coup Plot: According to historical accounts such as Samuel Segev’s The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-Contra Affair, Sharon met secretly in Kenya in 1982 with Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi and associates connected to Reza Pahlavi (son of the deposed Shah of Iran) to back a planned coup against Iran’s government. Sharon allegedly agreed to provide up to $800 million in arms and instruction, though the plot collapsed after Sharon was forced to resign as Defense Minister. The Kahan Commission had found him indirectly responsible for the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres. [1]

Connection to the Iran-Contra Scandal (1985–1986)

Laying the Groundwork: Israel’s initial intelligence and logistical channels to Iran—championed and expanded by figures like Sharon, David Kimche, and arms dealers in the early-to-mid 1980s—paved the way for the later U.S. “arms-for-hostages” dealings with Iran. [1, 2]
Central America and the Contras: Israel also acted as an early conduit for military assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras before and during the period when the Reagan administration sought to bypass U.S. congressional restrictions (such as the Boland Amendment), embedding Sharon’s earlier defense-establishment policies into the broader triangular web of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.–Contra operations. [1, 2, 3, 4]


Israel
See also: September 11 attacks advance-knowledge conspiracy theories § Israel
A conspiracy theory documented by the Anti-Defamation League, Thom Burnett and others is that the state of Israel was involved in the attacks, and may have planned them. A variety of motives are suggested, including: to cause the United States to attack enemies of Israel; to divert public attention away from Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians; to help Zionists take control of world affairs; and to persuade Americans to support Israel.

Variants of the theory contend that the attack was organized by then-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, the intelligence agency Mossad, or other actors from the Israeli government.
[149][150]

According to Slate, Kevin Barrett, a former lecturer at the University of Wisconsin, is a “leading advocate of theories that Israel’s Mossad orchestrated the 9/11 attacks.”[151]

My opinion:
It is entirely possible that The Bulldozer Sharon went to bed (IN CAHOOTS) with The Mastermind Putin in orchestrating the 9/11, with the intent of igniting the Anti-Arab sentiments and preserving the Israel’s air superiority.
It would be in line with his character, political personality, and very complex relationship with the U.S..

This thesis has to be investigated; in details and objectively: what, how, when, why, etc.
By whom?

Top Secret!
The Operation of Opening the America’s Eyes (9/11)
(And benefiting in the Process!)
The role of Israel in the 9/11 Attacks –
feeder.co/out/collection
Putin and Sharon met in the Kremlin on 9.4.01 (just one week prior to 9/11 Attacks).
What was on the agenda?
“Russia strongly condemns violence and calls for taking effective measures to fight terrorism”, the minutes said.
They have found a common ground with the “International Islamic Terrorism” (the wars in Chechnya and the West Bank), and the America ‘s reluctance to see it as the big problem.
As if they wanted to say:
“Something has to happen to open their eyes on this subject.
This is an Emergency!
Call 911!
We give our final approval!
Yeapps!”

Between January 1, 2001, and November 31, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon held one official face-to-face bilateral summit and at least three documented telephone conversations. Their interactions primarily revolved around the escalation of the Second Intifada, the U.S.-brokered peace blueprints, and deep Israeli concerns regarding Russian military and nuclear technology exports to Iran.

“The Bulldozer”
Ariel Sharon: political personality – Google Search




“The FBI and CIA had investigated potential leads connecting Saudi nationals and officials to some of the hijackers.”
Search: Were the “potential leads” of 9/11 to Russia, Germany, and Israel ADEQUATELY investigated?
Google AI: It remains a subject of historical debate …
My Opinion: The ADL frivolous accusations of antisemitism related to 9/11 Israel investigations are inappropriate.
“Mossad Role (False Claims): Claims that the Mossad or Israel orchestrated 9/11 are widely documented by organizations like the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) as antisemitic conspiracy theories and historical tropes lacking any factual or forensic backing.”
Search: “9/11 hijackers and Mossad”.
ADL is not the FBI to conduct the investigations.
Search: FBI and Anti-Defamation League (ADL)







Search Also: 

“The Bulldozer”Ariel Sharon and the CIA: a complex relationship


At the center of this hypothesis is the political personality of V. Putin, the true Mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. 9/11 is the counterintelligence error, with failure to monitor the foreign leaders closely and to try to understand better their motivations and actions, both overt and the covert.

He is the consensus builder, the recruiter, the uniter, the builder of the geopolitical alliances and coalitions, including very much in the spheres of Security and Intelligence.
That’s how he put himself and Russia at the head of the anti-American Intelligence alliance with Germany and Israel in the Operation 9/11.
AI Mode

The political personality of Russian President Vladimir Putin is widely analyzed by political psychologists, biographers, and intelligence experts as an “expansionist hostile enforcer” or a highly deliberative, high-dominance introvert whose behavior is deeply rooted in his background as a KGB officer. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Political scientists and psychological profilers break down his political personality through several primary frameworks:

1. The Psychodiagnostic Profile: “Expansionist Hostile Enforcer”

Using the Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria (MIDC) via open-source intelligence, researchers like Aubrey Immelman have classified Putin’s personality as a composite of three primary patterns: [1, 2]


My Opinion:
It is very unlikely that any documents on the true origins of 9/11 exist in principle – the matter is so sensitive and explosive. The plan was known to the very few people, presumably to Putin the Mastermind, his seconds, Patrushev and Bortnikov, likely, Schroeder, and probably some Mossad Chiefs. Hanning’s knowledge and tasks were likely limited by the Hamburg Cell. However, his ability to communicate with Russia and Israel, directly or via Azerbaijan, point to possibility of sharing this information and coordination. Hanning can disclose this and other information if he is given a good enough incentive in the process of further investigations.






While there is a verified historical intersection between Russian security agencies and a key architect of the 9/11 plot, mainstream intelligence and historical consensus attribute this to an operational failure rather than a collaborative overlap.
The connection primarily centers around Ayman al-Zawahiri, who later became the co-orchestrator of the September 11 attacks and leader of al-Qaeda. [1]
The Verified Contact: The 1996 Dagestan Detention
In December 1996, Ayman al-Zawahiri traveled to the North Caucasus to establish a base of operations in Chechnya. He was arrested by Russian authorities in Dagestan for entering the country illegally without a proper visa. [1, 2, 3]
#Russia and 9/11: Zawahiri, #Litvinenko, #Borovoy

While mainstream intelligence agencies and the 9/11 Commission report attribute the attacks strictly to Al-Qaeda operating out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the testimonies of Litvinenko and Borovoy remain the foundation for theories that the Kremlin conducted a dangerous “double game” with the hijackers’ leadership.

Search: Russia historically weaponized and infiltrated international terrorist organizations to serve its geopolitical interests—specifically utilizing them as leverage against Western powers.

–

Russian security agencies had deep, complex, and unacknowledged historical overlaps with figures who later formed the backbone of the 9/11 plot.


WHO BENEFITED? RUSSIA, GERMANY, ISRAEL.

THE EFFECTS: WHAT HAPPPENED AFTER 9/11?

The After Effects of 9/11 in suspected players and US:
THE RIGHTIST REALIGNMENT:
9/11 caused a global shift to the Right, in tune with Putin’s “conservatism”.
Mission accomplished!
Search:
How did Israel benefit geopolitically from 9/11?
How did Schroeder’s Germany change politically and geopolitically after 9/11?
How did Putin’s Russia change politically and geopolitically after 9/11?
Political shift to the Right in US after 9/11
RIGHTIST REALIGNMENT after 9/11
Putin’s conservatism

Search:
Geopolitical analysts and historians state that the September 11 attacks significantly altered the strategic landscape of the Middle East, yielding several geopolitical shifts that aligned with Israeli security objectives. While the immediate aftermath introduced complex diplomatic dynamics, the long-term changes fundamentally integrated Israel’s localized conflicts into a broader global framework.
According to assessments by foreign policy experts and historical analyses, Israel’s geopolitical position shifted in the following key ways:

Convergence of the Counter-Terrorism Narrative

Search: How did Schroeder’s Germany change politically and geopolitically after 9/11?

Following the September 11 attacks, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s Germany experienced a profound political transformation and structural geopolitical shift, fundamentally moving away from its post-WWII military reluctance toward an assertive, independent role in global security.

Political Changes: Domestic Security and Coalition Strain

  • The Proclamation of “Unlimited Solidarity”: Immediately after the attacks, Schröder declared Germany’s “unlimited solidarity” (uneingeschränkte Solidarität) with the United States. This was a massive psychological pivot for a nation deeply anchored in post-war pacifism.
  • The 2001 Vote of Confidence: To fulfill his promise of military support in Afghanistan, Schröder faced fierce resistance from fundamentalist factions within his own center-left SPD-Green coalition. To force compliance, he tied the deployment of 3,900 Bundeswehr troops to a vote of confidence in November 2001. He narrowly won, consolidating his leadership but exposing deep ideological rifts on the German left.

Search: How did Putin’s Russia change politically and geopolitically after 9/11?
The September 11 attacks served as a major catalyst for Vladimir Putin to reshape Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. Putin leveraged the global War on Terror to consolidate domestic political power and launch a dramatic, albeit short-lived, geopolitical pivot toward the West.
This period fundamentally transformed how Russia interacted with global powers and accelerated its transition toward centralized authoritarianism.

Geopolitical Transformations

The immediate aftermath of 9/11 marked a radical departure from traditional Russian foreign policy paradigms. [1]


August Hanning’s communications implicate both Israel and Russia in the hypothetical origins of 9/11

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The blame for MISINVESTIGATION of 9/11 is on Bush administration, FBI at that time, and Robert Mueller.
REINVESTIGATE THE 9/11!

Kash Patel, please add it to your list of the FBI historical mistakes, on the number 1 slot.
Thank you.
–


Search:

In counterintelligence and intelligence investigations surrounding the September 11 attacks, investigative hypotheses primarily focused on state-sponsored orchestration versus non-state actor autonomy, the operational security (OPSEC) tradecraft of the hijackers, and systemic structural vulnerabilities within U.S. intelligence. Rather than viewing 9/11 purely as a criminal act, counterintelligence (CI) investigators evaluated how foreign intelligence and extremist networks successfully penetrated domestic borders without triggering strategic warnings. [1, 2, 3]

1. State Sponsorship vs. Autonomous Network Support

A central counterintelligence hypothesis examined whether the al-Qaeda network operated entirely independently or relied on the covert assistance of foreign governments or intelligence services.
  • Foreign State Facilitation: The FBI’s massive PENTTBOM investigation and subsequent congressional inquiries heavily evaluated whether elements within foreign governments provided logistical, financial, or intelligence support to the hijackers. This included intensive vetting of figures like Omar al-Bayoumi to determine if they acted as foreign intelligence assets helping the hijackers embed in the U.S. [2, 4, 5]
  • Financial Intelligence: Investigators tested hypotheses concerning insider trading and illicit international banking systems. The 9/11 Commission Report ultimately concluded that while unusual pre-9/11 market transactions occurred, they lacked an intelligence-linked nexus to advance knowledge of the attacks. [6, 7]

…

4. Systemic Vulnerabilities and the Intelligence “Wall”

A critical hypothesis evaluated by post-9/11 reviews—including the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General—was that domestic legal barriers effectively blinded U.S. counterintelligence. [11]
  • The Information Barrier: Legal interpretations in the 1990s built a rigid “wall” preventing foreign intelligence investigators from sharing data with domestic criminal investigators. [12, 13]
  • Tracking Failures: The investigative hypothesis confirmed that this separation caused systemic communication failures. For instance, though the CIA and NSA possessed data regarding hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, the information was not successfully integrated into FBI domestic counterintelligence operations until it was too late. [12, 14, 15]

…

The nature of these investigative hypotheses is defined by several core analytical focus areas:

1. The Operational Security (OPSEC) and Counter-Espionage Hypothesis

A primary hypothesis in CI investigations is determining how a hostile network operated undetected within domestic borders for an extended period.
  • The “Zero Lapses” Premise: Investigators evaluate how the 19 hijackers maintained stringent operational security over 20 months in the United States. [1, 2]
  • Tradecraft Assessment: Counterintelligence personnel form hypotheses regarding whether the operatives received formal intelligence training. For 9/11, subsequent investigations—including testimony to the 9/11 Joint Inquiry—concluded that the conspirators executed highly effective defensive counterintelligence tradecraft, showing no major operational slips that would tip off federal agencies. [1, 2, 3]

2. The Foreign State Sponsorship and Facilitation Hypothesis

Counterintelligence investigations routinely establish hypotheses regarding whether non-state terrorist actors are operating as proxies or receiving active facilitation from foreign intelligence services (FIS).
  • Logistical Support Networks: Investigators look for anomalies in funding, travel documentation, and housing to hypothesize whether foreign intelligence officers or diplomatic staff aided the cells.
  • State vs. Non-State Dynamics: In the context of 9/11, massive investigative resources were dedicated to exploring potential institutional links to foreign governments, specifically examining whether foreign intelligence entities provided safe passage, funding, or strategic cover.

See Also:


Search also: 

AI Mode

The 19 al-Qaeda hijackers successfully maintained strict operational security (OPSEC) and counterintelligence tradecraft over 20 months in the United States by operating with calculated deception rather than reckless fanaticism. According to the 9/11 Commission Report and subsequent intelligence studies, the conspirators successfully blended into Western society and exploited systemic loopholes while avoiding behaviors that would trigger law enforcement scrutiny. [1, 2, 3]
The cell utilized several foundational strategies to safeguard their plot:
1. Cultural Assimilation and Broad Deception
The operatives went to great lengths to alter their lifestyles and appearances to pass as ordinary Western students or tourists. [1, 2]


Search also: 

My opinion: 

The future hijackers were seamlessly guided, assisted, and continuously weaponized by the invisible networks of the expert forces in both Germany and the US. 

The high level of this expertise and skills indicate their hypothetical connection with the professional intelligence services: Russian, German, Israeli, or all three, in some sort of coordinated fashion. 





LINKS 


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The role of Israel in the 9/11 Attacks – Review

x.com1d@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad It is entirely possible that The Bulldozer Sharon went to bed (IN CAHOOTS) with The Mastermind Putin in orchestrating the 9/11, wi…

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Sharon remained perpetually suspicious that Washington would pressure him into territorial or security concessions

The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks – All Feeds Reviewx.com2h@mikenov: Sharon remained perpetually suspicious that Washington would pressure him into territorial or security…

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All Feeds Review: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

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The Declassified 9/11 PDBs

 The Declassified 9/11 PDBs


    1.1 The Declassified 9/11 PDBs

The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: what transpired? 

The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The induced “warning fatigue”

The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: Questionable sources, skillful placements 

Induced “Warning Fatigue”:

The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: questionable sources, skillful placements, warning fatigue – AI Mode

Induced “Warning Fatigue”
The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: questionable sources, skillful placements, warning fatigue – AI Mode
Pic.: YouTube:
youtube.com/watch?v=LkAGZI
The massive September 2026 declassification by the CIA of 71 Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) spanning 1998 to 2001 provides a granular look at the agonizing intelligence mosaic presented to Presidents Clinton and Bush before the September 11 attacks. [1, 2, 3]
Rather than revealing a single “smoking gun,” these highly guarded documents illustrate the complex, systemic friction of counterterrorism in the pre-9/11 era. The core themes of your query highlight exactly why the strategic warnings failed to translate into tactical prevention: [1, 2]

1. Questionable Sources vs. Plausible Threats

Before the modern mandate of explicitly grading analytical “confidence levels” and source reliability, analysts had to pass along fragmented human intelligence (HUMINT) that was difficult to verify. [1, 2]
The Dilemma: A PDB from July 3, 1998, explicitly highlighted intelligence coming from “highly questionable sources” regarding Osama bin Laden planning attacks inside the U.S.. [1]
The Analytical Trap: Despite the suspect nature of the raw data, analysts still judged that such a strike was “plausible”. This forced policymakers to weigh potentially fabricated or exaggerated informant reports against catastrophic, worst-case scenarios. [1]

2. Skillful Placements and Strategic Deception

Al-Qaeda operated with highly sophisticated operational security (OPSEC), deliberately scattering clues, changing timelines, and forcing analysts to chase ghosts. [1, 2]
The “Lull” Effect: A PDB from July 24, 2001, noted that for the second time in two weeks, an “expected imminent Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operation has been postponed”. [1, 2]
Fragmented Chatter: While intercepted “cryptic messages” and suspicious local surveillance were documented, the information was heavily obscured. Al-Qaeda’s skillful placement of operational moving parts across months and continents ensured that the CIA could aggressively track bin Laden’s intent but could “cannot pinpoint targets or timing.” [1, 2]

3. Warning Fatigue and Loud Strategic Noise

The intelligence community was essentially screaming into the void, but the sheer volume of vague, repetitive warnings over a four-year period inadvertently created a paralyzing case of warning fatigue. [1, 2]
The Deluge: The historical records show that by the summer of 2001, the system was blinking red. The famous August 6, 2001 PDB (“Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US”) was actually the 36th item briefed to President Bush that year alone regarding Al-Qaeda.
The Consequence: Because intelligence arrived as “long and loud strategic warnings” rather than specific actionable details, administrations across both political parties struggled to sustain a crisis-level footing. When everything is treated as an imminent, vague catastrophe, true tactical prioritization becomes nearly impossible. [1, 2, 3]
Ultimately, this unprecedented release of PDBs underscores the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission Report: the failure wasn’t a lack of raw data or a failure to realize that bin Laden wanted to attack. It was a systemic failure of “imagination” to synthesize spotty, questionable intelligence into a clear picture of how those threats would actually manifest. [1, 2]

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The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The “warning fatigue” deliberately induced by the hypothetical culprits: Russia, Germany, Israel – Google Search

Declassified 9/11 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) and official U.S. government investigations contain no evidence suggesting Russia, Germany, or Israel deliberately induced “warning fatigue” to facilitate the September 11 attacks.

Declassified documents, including the famous August 6, 2001 PDB titled “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US,” and the final findings of the 9/11 Commission Report, establish that the high volume of threat intelligence during the summer of 2001 was a direct result of Al-Qaeda’s operational planning and communications, not a geopolitical conspiracy by foreign states.

Historical Context of the 2001 Threat “Spike”

Al-Qaeda Responsibility: The surge in intelligence reports—often described by officials as the “system blinking red”—was driven entirely by chatter, movements, and logistical preparations by Al-Qaeda operatives.
The “Warning Fatigue” Dynamic: While intelligence officials experienced immense pressure due to a constant stream of vague, non-specific threats, the 9/11 Commission attributed the intelligence failures to institutional “lack of imagination” and bureaucratic silos between the CIA and FBI, rather than external, state-sponsored manipulation.

Roles of the Mentioned Nations in 9/11 Intelligence

The official record outlines the actual interactions with Russia, Germany, and Israel regarding the 9/11 intelligence landscape:

CountryActual Historical Connection to 9/11 IntelligenceRussiaIn the summer of 2001, Russian intelligence services passed warnings to the U.S. regarding Al-Qaeda’s intent to launch a significant terrorist operation, based on their tracking of networks linked to the ongoing conflict in Chechnya.GermanyGermany was a primary hub for the “Hamburg Cell,” which included hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. German intelligence (BfV) was actively tracking various extremist elements but did not uncover the plot before it occurred. Following the attacks, Germany cooperated extensively with the U.S. investigation.IsraelIsraeli intelligence (Mossad) provided generalized warnings to U.S. agencies in August 2001 that a large-scale terrorist assault inside the United States was imminent, specifically cautioning that a major cell of operatives was being organized.
The narrative that these nations orchestrated a coordinated disinformation campaign to dull U.S. defenses relies on unverified alternative theories that run counter to the extensive public record and declassified archives.

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The Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The “warning fatigue” deliberately induced by the hypothetical culprits: Russia, Germany, Israel – Google Search


Analyzing 9/11 PDBs:

Persistent but useless warnings about the Al Qaeda in intelligence reports, including from Russia, Germany, and Israel as the cover: questionable sources, skillful placements – GS

9/11 PDBs: Warning Fatigue and Sources – Gemini