Russia News: Газета.Ru – Новости часа: В конгрессе США затребовали налоговые декларации Трампа

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Председатель комитета по налогам палаты представителей США Ричард Нил затребовал у минфина страны и налоговой службы налоговые декларации президента США Дональда Трампа за шесть лет, передает РИА “Новости”.

По данным агентства, …

Газета.Ru – Новости часа

Russia News


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Russia News: Lenta.ru : Новости: Оппозиция выдвинула ультиматум Макрону

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Председатель партии «Национальное объединение» Марин Ле Пен полагает, что предстоящие выборы в Европарламент превратились для Франции в референдум доверия президенту Эмманюэлю Макрону, и в случае проигрыша он должен будет покинуть свой пост. Она также обвинила Макрона в игнорировании французских граждан.

Lenta.ru : Новости

Russia News


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Russia News: Аргументы и Факты: Тонны нефтепродуктов вытекли в Хьюстонский судоходный канал

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В настоящее время на месте происшествия работают сотрудники профильной службы, пожарные и спасатели

Аргументы и Факты

Russia News


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1. Russia from Michael_Novakhov (116 sites): “shoigu” – Google News: Putin ‘dominates’ in hockey game with ex-NHLers – New York Post

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Putin ‘dominates’ in hockey game with ex-NHLers  New York Post

Russian President Vladimir Putin scored eight goals in an exhibition ice-hockey game with former NHL players.

“shoigu” – Google News

1. Russia from Michael_Novakhov (116 sites)


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1. Russia from Michael_Novakhov (116 sites): Voice of America: Ebola Outbreak Could Spiral Beyond DRC, WHO Warns

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Contributors include Erikas Mwisi reporting from Beni, North Kivu; Margaret Basheer from the United Nations; and Eddy Isango, James Butty and Carol Guensburg from Washington.

Armed attacks, misinformation and a growing funding gap continue to impede the response to the Ebola outbreak in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, with the World Health Organization warning that the situation could spiral out of control.

Insecurity leaves response teams “unable to perform robust surveillance nor deliver much needed treatment and immunizations,” the WHO reported Friday in its latest update on the outbreak confirmed last August. The health organization warned that “without commitment from all groups to cease these attacks, it is unlikely that this EVD [Ebola virus disease] outbreak can remain successfully contained in North Kivu and Ituri provinces.”

The disease could spill into other parts of the country and across the borders of neighboring Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan, the health organization suggested.

This month alone has brought setbacks such as a violent assault on a burial team in the town of Katwa and a gunfight between at least 50 armed militia and security forces in the city of Butembo, WHO reported. Mourners also buried Richard Valery Mouzoko Kiboung, a 41-year-old Cameroonian doctor killed April 19 while working for WHO and meeting with other front-line workers at Butembo University Hospital.

The threats continue.

On Thursday, a VOA correspondent in Butembo saw a series of letters scattered on a street, each weighted down with pebbles. Written in Swahili and attributed to Mai-Mai fighters, the letters warned police, soldiers and the general public against showing any support for Ebola responders or treatment centers. 

Anderson Djumah, whose 10-year-old son is being treated for Ebola at the general hospital in the North Kivu town of Beni, complained that “the lack of security has just added more suffering.”

“Even Ebola treatment centers are targeted by the assailants. We’re afraid. Ebola is killing so many people. We’re still expecting that the government would be able to protect us,” he said. “… [But] some people who are sick with Ebola are fleeing to other places for their lives and are meanwhile spreading the sickness.”

Complications for care

Violence sends people into hiding and disrupts response operations such as contact tracing, vaccination and safe burials, giving “time and space to the virus to spread within the community and make more victims,” Jessica Ilunga, spokeswoman for the DRC’s health ministry, told VOA.

“Every time we have a security incident, the number of cases and deaths obviously increases,” Ilunga said.

The health ministry, leading the response with WHO’s help, reported 1,600 total cases as of Wednesday, with 1,534 confirmed and 66 likely. This second-worst Ebola outbreak already has claimed 1,069 lives. The 2014-15 West African outbreak killed more than 11,000.

Many of the victims have died at home, potentially exposing others to the disease and leaving gaps in how — and to whom — the virus may have been transmitted.

“You don’t know who those contacts are,” said epidemiologist Jennifer Nuzzo, an epidemiologist and principal investigator for the Outbreak Observatory, a project of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. “… Chances are you can’t offer them vaccines or treatment.”

Funding for the Ebola response has fallen far short of need, WHO spokesman Tarik Jasarevic said in an email to VOA Wednesday. As of May 2, WHO had received $32.5 million of the $87 million it estimated needing for six months ending in July.

“If the funds are not received,” Jasarevic wrote, “WHO will be unable to sustain the response at the current scale.” 

​New challenges in 10th DRC outbreak

This is the DRC’s 10th reported outbreak since the virus’ discovery near the Ebola River in 1976. The country has proved adept at snuffing out past outbreaks of Ebola, which has been found in bats, monkeys and other animals sometimes consumed as “bush meat.” The virus spreads through contact with an infected person’s body fluids.

Ebola was unfamiliar in the northeast, a region already destabilized by at least two decades of conflict. More than 100 armed groups roam the area, displacing hundreds of thousands of people.

High mobility and population density also raise the potential that the virus could cross into Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan. (The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has been providing technical guidance to the DRC and its neighbors, for instance, helping them ramp up surveillance and vaccination tracking.)

Wary public

Skepticism also factors into the Ebola equation. The northeast is an opposition stronghold, and its residents were angered to be kept from voting in December’s general elections, as former U.S. diplomat John Campbell pointed out in a Council on Foreign Relations blog post.

A study published in The Lancet medical journal in March found low public trust in local authorities and broad acceptance of misinformation about Ebola. Just a third of the 961 respondents — adults surveyed in North Kivu’s Beni and Butembo last fall — said they had confidence that local authorities acted in the public interest. A fourth indicated they didn’t believe Ebola exists.

Mistrust and misinformation make it less likely that individuals will heed public safety directives, such as accepting Ebola vaccines, seeking formal medical care or supporting safe burial practices, the researchers noted.

That mistrust can be weaponized, as Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders experienced. Two of the international aid group’s Ebola treatment centers, in Katwa and Butembo, were attacked in February. MSF suspended services there, saying its ability to respond in the outbreak’s epicenter had been “crippled.” 

Anne-Marie Pegg, MSF’s clinical lead for epidemic response, said some Congolese look critically at the disparity between local clinics, which, if they exist, might lack basics such as running water and electricity, and the better-equipped Ebola treatment centers set up by international aid groups.

“Very little investment has gone into the existing health structures and the existing health system, and people notice this,” Pegg said. She said MSF, in “numerous interactions,” has heard complaints that international groups are involved “‘only because we [locals] are contagious and we’re a threat to you.’

“It’s not surprising that something like Ebola can be manipulated for any variety of reasons,” Pegg added. “… Absolutely, there are interest groups from all sides that are trying to use this.”

MSF continues to work in the region while pressing for “better integration of Ebola treatment into the health care system,” Pegg said. The virus’ early symptoms, such as headaches and muscle pain, are indistinguishable from those of malaria or other more common ailments, so “it’s difficult for someone who’s sick to think, ‘I have Ebola.’ So the capacity to isolate someone who may have an Ebola infection and test for that … needs to happen at a local level” rather than sending patients to a treatment center. “It would be nice if those people could be treated closer to home” and started on treatment while awaiting test results. If the virus is confirmed, then transfer the patient to an Ebola treatment center, “which is the best place.”

But, she said, MSF’s goal is to treat whatever ailment a patient might have.

​Vaccine plans revised

As Ebola infections rise, a WHO advisory group this week recommended that an approved vaccine be distributed more widely in smaller doses and that an experimental vaccine, developed by Johnson & Johnson, also be offered. More than 100,000 doses of the approved Merck vaccine have been distributed since August, but supplies are running low. The dosage would be halved from the current 1 milliliter for the primary and secondary “ring vaccination,” which prescribes inoculation for anyone in contact with an infected person. Eligibility would be expanded through “pop-up and targeted geographic approaches” in high-risk areas.

“We know that vaccination is saving lives in this outbreak,” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said in a statement.

The advisory group also recommended more training for local health workers.

Voice of America

1. Russia from Michael_Novakhov (116 sites)


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Counterintelligence from Michael_Novakhov (51 sites): Eurasia Review: Can Trust Be Verified? Managing 5G Risk In Southeast Asia – Analysis

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Nothing can fully protect a country from secret malfeasance involving the company it hires to provide and maintain its 5th generation wireless system (5G). But certain steps can lessen the risk. One is to learn how secure the firm’s technology is; another is to estimate the chance that the laws and institutions in the firm’s home country will prevent the government there from accessing the firm’s data and algorithms without the user country’s permission.

By Donald K. Emmerson*

Trust but verify.
That mantra from nuclear-weapons negotiation discourse during the Cold
War is newly relevant today. Versions of the advice are circulating
among governments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere as they weigh the
security risks of partnering with this or that company to install the
fifth-generation telecommunications technology known as 5G.

It is tempting to believe that a technical solution to the problem of
unwanted risk exists — a clever digital tweak that will fully and
permanently protect a 5G network’s users. It does not. The best one can
hope for is a “good enough” balancing of faith and proof that is —
arguably, not assuredly — reassuring and realistic. Characteristics of
the network-offering company in its home country and of the
network-purchasing government in its own country will shape the 5G
seller-buyer bargain and its location. This will occur on an eventual
spectrum of arrangements between the unwise and the unworkable:
unverified trust at one extreme end, trust-eliminating verification at
the other.

Enter Huawei

China’s Huawei Technologies is an ostensibly private (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/technology/who-owns-huawei.html)
company founded in China’s mercantilistic state-capitalist economy by a
former People’s Liberation Army engineer. Southeast Asian governments
are considering whether to rely on Huawei’s technology in an upcoming 5G
world.

If a potential buyer insisted on continuous verification, Huawei
would need to agree to the installation and maintenance of hardware and
software designed to expunge from the system any present or future “back
door” through which China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) or the
Communist Party of China (CPC) could walk.

But even if Huawei agreed, would its software updates uphold that
initial consent? Full prudence would oblige the user state to
re-investigate the workings of the system whenever Huawei saw fit to
alter the code. But whose investigators, employing what possibly
proprietary knowledge, how thoroughly, and at whose and what expense?

Scheduled updates aside, if and as adaptive machine self-learning
becomes increasingly the norm, 5G software will be continually changing
itself, potentially opening new vulnerabilities to breaching and
manipulation. And even if every new back door is somehow dismantled or
prevented, the MSS or the CPC could simply knock on Huawei’s physical
front door at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen to ask for access
to the system.

Fearing the  visitor and obliged to comply with the intrusive
prerogatives of the state authorised in China’s National Intelligence
Law, Article 7 (https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/%e4%b8%ad%e5%8d%8e%e4%ba%ba%e6%b0%91%e5%85%b1%e5%92%8c%e5%9b%bd%e5%9b%bd%e5%ae%b6%e6%83%85%e6%8a%a5%e6%b3%95/?lang=en), Huawei will open the door.

Whom To Trust?

Whom will you trust? And how much? Technical guardrails and patches
can reduce but not remove the subjectivity of those necessary questions.
In Southeast Asia, differing political and economic contexts will
influence the answers. Other things being equal, governments indebted to
China may feel less free to turn down Huawei. Lower-income countries
may opt for Huawei because it is cheaper to do so. Poorer countries
already tilted towards Beijing, such as Cambodia, may hire Huawei on
both grounds.

History will also matter. Vietnam recently observed the 40th
anniversary of its 1979 invasion by China and the brief war that
followed.

Unsurprising in that context, Vietnam has granted its first 5G
licence to a homegrown firm, Viettel, and is reportedly open to working
with two Scandinavia-based multinationals—Nokia in Finland and Ericsson
in Sweden (https://www.cio.com/article/3310197/how-is-vietnam-preparing-for-5g.html).

Huawei, Nokia, and Ericsson are competing neck-and-neck for shares in
the global market for the radio access network (RAN) equipment needed
to enable 5G transmission. One analyst’s estimate of the three
companies’ shares of 5G subscribers worldwide in 2023 who will be using
their respective RANs has the distribution as follows: Huawei with 25
percent; Nokia and Ericsson each with 23 percent; and the remaining 30
percent split among other firms (https://www.telecompetitor.com/5g-ran-market-share-research-three-vendors-run-neck-and-neck/).

Food For Thought About Policy Choices

Relevant in this context is the devastating review of Huawei in the
fifth annual report of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre
(HCSEC) Oversight Board (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/huawei-cyber-security-evaluation-centre-oversight-board-annual-report-2019), released in the United Kingdom on 28 March 2019.

Based on its investigation, the board found persisting “serious and
systematic defects in Huawei’s software engineering and cyber security
competence” resulting in “extensive vulnerability” and “significantly
increased risk” for users.

Huawei’s products were judged as having “no end-to-end integrity” and
the firm’s software management was found “defective”. The board had
only “limited confidence” in Huawei’s ability even “to understand the
content” of its own products, presumably rendering the company incapable
of diagnosing “identified issues” needing remedy.

Lessons To Be Learned

In cybersecurity, because perfection is impossible, it should not be
made the enemy of the reasonably good. There is an opportunity here for
governments and companies to scale up the methods that HCSEC used and
the lessons it learned in the course of its experience investigating
Huawei.

Those lessons could contribute to the drafting of a checklist of
tests and standards for use by Southeast Asian and other states when
choosing between G5 network providers. User states could benefit further
by taking into account the trustworthiness not only of a given 5G firm,
but of its home government as well.

Vietnamese officials may not have looked up the World Justice
Project’s 2019 Rule of Law Index of Constraints on Government Powers (https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2019-Single%20Page%20View-Reduced.pdf).
It ranks 126 countries by the extent to which the government in each
one is held accountable within an effective framework of law that limits
its power. Finland and Sweden are respectively 3rd and 4th. The UK is
11th. China is 119th.

This is not an infomercial for Nokia or Ericsson in Scandinavia, nor
for HCSEC in the UK. It is just a little food for possible thought about
the policy choices that will shape the digital future of Southeast
Asia.

*Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, where he is also affiliated with the Center on Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. He contributed this article specially to RSIS Commentary. His edited book, The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century, is forthcoming in 2019.

Eurasia Review

Counterintelligence from Michael_Novakhov (51 sites)


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1. US Security from Michael_Novakhov (88 sites): Eurasia Review: Can Trust Be Verified? Managing 5G Risk In Southeast Asia – Analysis

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Nothing can fully protect a country from secret malfeasance involving the company it hires to provide and maintain its 5th generation wireless system (5G). But certain steps can lessen the risk. One is to learn how secure the firm’s technology is; another is to estimate the chance that the laws and institutions in the firm’s home country will prevent the government there from accessing the firm’s data and algorithms without the user country’s permission.

By Donald K. Emmerson*

Trust but verify.
That mantra from nuclear-weapons negotiation discourse during the Cold
War is newly relevant today. Versions of the advice are circulating
among governments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere as they weigh the
security risks of partnering with this or that company to install the
fifth-generation telecommunications technology known as 5G.

It is tempting to believe that a technical solution to the problem of
unwanted risk exists — a clever digital tweak that will fully and
permanently protect a 5G network’s users. It does not. The best one can
hope for is a “good enough” balancing of faith and proof that is —
arguably, not assuredly — reassuring and realistic. Characteristics of
the network-offering company in its home country and of the
network-purchasing government in its own country will shape the 5G
seller-buyer bargain and its location. This will occur on an eventual
spectrum of arrangements between the unwise and the unworkable:
unverified trust at one extreme end, trust-eliminating verification at
the other.

Enter Huawei

China’s Huawei Technologies is an ostensibly private (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/technology/who-owns-huawei.html)
company founded in China’s mercantilistic state-capitalist economy by a
former People’s Liberation Army engineer. Southeast Asian governments
are considering whether to rely on Huawei’s technology in an upcoming 5G
world.

If a potential buyer insisted on continuous verification, Huawei
would need to agree to the installation and maintenance of hardware and
software designed to expunge from the system any present or future “back
door” through which China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) or the
Communist Party of China (CPC) could walk.

But even if Huawei agreed, would its software updates uphold that
initial consent? Full prudence would oblige the user state to
re-investigate the workings of the system whenever Huawei saw fit to
alter the code. But whose investigators, employing what possibly
proprietary knowledge, how thoroughly, and at whose and what expense?

Scheduled updates aside, if and as adaptive machine self-learning
becomes increasingly the norm, 5G software will be continually changing
itself, potentially opening new vulnerabilities to breaching and
manipulation. And even if every new back door is somehow dismantled or
prevented, the MSS or the CPC could simply knock on Huawei’s physical
front door at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen to ask for access
to the system.

Fearing the  visitor and obliged to comply with the intrusive
prerogatives of the state authorised in China’s National Intelligence
Law, Article 7 (https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/%e4%b8%ad%e5%8d%8e%e4%ba%ba%e6%b0%91%e5%85%b1%e5%92%8c%e5%9b%bd%e5%9b%bd%e5%ae%b6%e6%83%85%e6%8a%a5%e6%b3%95/?lang=en), Huawei will open the door.

Whom To Trust?

Whom will you trust? And how much? Technical guardrails and patches
can reduce but not remove the subjectivity of those necessary questions.
In Southeast Asia, differing political and economic contexts will
influence the answers. Other things being equal, governments indebted to
China may feel less free to turn down Huawei. Lower-income countries
may opt for Huawei because it is cheaper to do so. Poorer countries
already tilted towards Beijing, such as Cambodia, may hire Huawei on
both grounds.

History will also matter. Vietnam recently observed the 40th
anniversary of its 1979 invasion by China and the brief war that
followed.

Unsurprising in that context, Vietnam has granted its first 5G
licence to a homegrown firm, Viettel, and is reportedly open to working
with two Scandinavia-based multinationals—Nokia in Finland and Ericsson
in Sweden (https://www.cio.com/article/3310197/how-is-vietnam-preparing-for-5g.html).

Huawei, Nokia, and Ericsson are competing neck-and-neck for shares in
the global market for the radio access network (RAN) equipment needed
to enable 5G transmission. One analyst’s estimate of the three
companies’ shares of 5G subscribers worldwide in 2023 who will be using
their respective RANs has the distribution as follows: Huawei with 25
percent; Nokia and Ericsson each with 23 percent; and the remaining 30
percent split among other firms (https://www.telecompetitor.com/5g-ran-market-share-research-three-vendors-run-neck-and-neck/).

Food For Thought About Policy Choices

Relevant in this context is the devastating review of Huawei in the
fifth annual report of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre
(HCSEC) Oversight Board (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/huawei-cyber-security-evaluation-centre-oversight-board-annual-report-2019), released in the United Kingdom on 28 March 2019.

Based on its investigation, the board found persisting “serious and
systematic defects in Huawei’s software engineering and cyber security
competence” resulting in “extensive vulnerability” and “significantly
increased risk” for users.

Huawei’s products were judged as having “no end-to-end integrity” and
the firm’s software management was found “defective”. The board had
only “limited confidence” in Huawei’s ability even “to understand the
content” of its own products, presumably rendering the company incapable
of diagnosing “identified issues” needing remedy.

Lessons To Be Learned

In cybersecurity, because perfection is impossible, it should not be
made the enemy of the reasonably good. There is an opportunity here for
governments and companies to scale up the methods that HCSEC used and
the lessons it learned in the course of its experience investigating
Huawei.

Those lessons could contribute to the drafting of a checklist of
tests and standards for use by Southeast Asian and other states when
choosing between G5 network providers. User states could benefit further
by taking into account the trustworthiness not only of a given 5G firm,
but of its home government as well.

Vietnamese officials may not have looked up the World Justice
Project’s 2019 Rule of Law Index of Constraints on Government Powers (https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2019-Single%20Page%20View-Reduced.pdf).
It ranks 126 countries by the extent to which the government in each
one is held accountable within an effective framework of law that limits
its power. Finland and Sweden are respectively 3rd and 4th. The UK is
11th. China is 119th.

This is not an infomercial for Nokia or Ericsson in Scandinavia, nor
for HCSEC in the UK. It is just a little food for possible thought about
the policy choices that will shape the digital future of Southeast
Asia.

*Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, where he is also affiliated with the Center on Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. He contributed this article specially to RSIS Commentary. His edited book, The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century, is forthcoming in 2019.

Eurasia Review

1. US Security from Michael_Novakhov (88 sites)


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1. Russia from Michael_Novakhov (116 sites): “Nato Russia” – Google News: Why The US Is Silent About Military Exercises In The Baltic States – OpEd – Eurasia Review

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Why The US Is Silent About Military Exercises In The Baltic States – OpEd  Eurasia Review

The Baltic States are in the anticipation of the annual large scale military exercise Saber Strike. The well-known annual international exercise held since 2010 by …

“Nato Russia” – Google News

1. Russia from Michael_Novakhov (116 sites)


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